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In June 2013 Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Barton Gellman be-
gan to publish stories in The Guardian and The Washington Post based on
arguably the most significant national security leak in American history.1
By leaking a large cache of classified documents to these reporters, Edward
Snowden launched the most extensive public reassessment of surveillance
practices by the American security establishment since the mid-1970s.2
Within six months, nineteen bills had been introduced in Congress to sub-
stantially reform the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) bulk collection
program and its oversight process;3 a federal judge had held that one of the
major disclosed programs violated the Fourth Amendment;4 a special Presi-
dent’s Review Group (“PRG”), appointed by the President, had issued a
report that called for extensive reforms of NSA bulk collection and abandon-
ment of some of the disclosed practices;5 and the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) found that one of the disclosed programs sig-
nificantly implicated constitutional rights and was likely unconstitutional.6
The public debate and calls for reform across all three branches of govern-
ment overwhelmingly support the proposition that the leaks exposed lax
democratic accountability of the national security establishment as well as
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1 See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Mines Internet Firms’ Data, Documents
Show, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, at A1; Glenn Greenwald, US Orders Phone Firm to Hand
Over Data on Millions of Calls: Top Secret Court Ruling Demands ‘Ongoing, Daily’ Data
From Verizon, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 6, 2013, at 1.
2 For a review of the offending practices and major reforms, see Continued Oversight of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2013) (statement of Laura K. Donohue, Acting Director, Georgetown Center on
National Security and the Law).
3 Michelle Richardson & Robyn Greene, NSA Legislation Since the Leaks Began, AMERI-
CAN C IVIL L IBERTIES U NION BLOG (Aug. 15, 2013, 10:48 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
national-security/nsa-legislation-leaks-began.
4 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
5 See RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.
pdf [hereinafter PRG REPORT].
6 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PRO-
GRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 103-37 (2014), available at http://www.
pclob.gov/meetings-and-events/2014meetingsevents/23-january-2014-public-meeting [herein-
after PCLOB REPORT] (although the PCLOB also found that the government lawyers were
entitled to rely on precedent for the opposite proposition as long as the Supreme Court did not
directly hold on the matter).282 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
practices widely viewed as threatening to fundamental rights of privacy and
association.  Nonetheless, the Justice Department pursued a criminal indict-
ment against the man whose disclosures catalyzed the public debate.  That
prosecutorial persistence reflects a broader shift in the use of criminal law to
suppress national security leaks in the post-9/11 state of emergency.  That
shift by the executive branch, in turn, requires congressional response in the
form of a new criminal law defense,7 the Public Accountability Defense I
outline here.
The past decade has seen an increase in accountability leaks: unautho-
rized national security leaks and whistleblowing that challenge systemic
practices, alongside aggressive criminal prosecution of leakers more gener-
ally.  Most prominent among these have been leaks exposing the original
“President’s Surveillance Program” (known as “PSP” or “warrantless wire-
tapping”),8 AT&T’s complicity in facilitating bulk electronic surveillance,9
and ultimately Snowden’s leaks.  Private Chelsea (then Bradley) Manning’s
disclosures to Wikileaks covered a broader range of topics and dominated
newspapers throughout the world for weeks.10  The Obama Administration,
in turn, has brought more criminal prosecutions against leakers than all prior
administrations combined,11 and Private Manning’s thirty-five-year sentence
was substantially more severe than any prior sentence imposed for leaks to
the press.12  One possible explanation is that leaks in general have increased
in number as a result of background technological change: digitization
makes leaking documents easier and the prosecutions simply respond to the
technologically-driven increase in leaks.13  If this thesis is correct, then the
increase in prosecutions is a “natural” response to a background change in
leaking practice.  There is, however, no robust evidence that the number of
7 As will become clear, the defense calls for legislation aimed to counter systemic imper-
fections in the imperviousness of the national security establishment to public scrutiny.  It is
not based on any claimed speech rights of government employees. See Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (rejecting a First Amendment claim by a government employee who
suffered retaliation for criticizing prosecutorial abuse he observed); United States v. Snepp,
444 U.S. 507, 526 (1980) (CIA agent’s First Amendment rights not violated by requirement to
submit books for review by Agency).
8 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Court Order,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; Michael Isikoff, The Whistleblower Who Exposed Warrant-
less Wiretaps,  NEWSWEEK (Dec. 12, 2008, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
whistleblower-who-exposed-warrantless-wiretaps-82805.
9 See John Markoff & Scott Shane, Documents Show Links Between AT&T and Agency in
Eavesdropping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A1.
10 See generally David Leigh & Luke Harding, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE J ULIAN A SSANGE’S
WAR O N S ECRECY (2011); Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the
Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011).
11  See David Carr, Blurred Line Between Espionage and Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2012, at B1.
12 Justin Mazzola, Chelsea Manning: Which One Doesn’t Belong, LIVEWIRE (Nov. 20,
2013), http://livewire.amnesty.org/2013/11/20/chelsea-manning-which-one-doesnt-belong/.
For analysis of the other cases, see infra Part IV.
13 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
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national security leaks has increased in the past decade or so.14  Moreover,
the technological thesis does not fit the fact that of the sixteen national se-
curity leak and whistleblowing cases of the past decade, only two—Manning
and Snowden—were facilitated by the Internet and computers.15  What does
appear to have increased, however, is the number of national security leaks
that purport to expose systemic abuse or a systemic need for accountability.
This increase mirrors a similar spike during the legitimacy crisis created by
the Vietnam War.  Twelve to fourteen of the sixteen cases,16 including Man-
ning and Snowden, better fit a “legitimacy crisis” explanation for increased
leaking concerning systemic failure.17  The post-9/11 War on Terror and its
attendant torture, rendition, indefinite detention, civilian collateral damage,
and illegal domestic spying created a crisis of conscience for some insiders
in the national security establishment.  A consideration of the actual cases of
the past decade suggests that it is this loss of legitimacy of decisions that
likely underlies the increase in these kinds of systemic leaks. Technology
certainly does play a role.  It introduced the special challenges of bulk leaks,
characterized by the Snowden and Manning cases, it has made detection and
prosecution of leakers easier, and it has offered an alternative range of tech-
niques outside the government to improve the ability to diagnose from the
outside what is happening, as was the case with the disclosure of the secret
prisons.18  But the evidence does not support a thesis that there has been a
general increase in leaks, nor does it support the idea that the relatively large
number of leaks concerning arguably illegitimate action was primarily
caused by a technological change.
If legitimacy crisis, rather than technological change, is the primary
driver of the increase since 2002 of the particular class of leaks that is most
important in a democracy, then the present prosecutorial deviation from a
long tradition of using informal rather than criminal sanctions19 represents a
substantial threat to democracy.  In particular, it threatens public accounta-
bility for violations of human and civil rights, abuses of emergency powers,
14 See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Con-
dones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 528–30 (2013) (survey-
ing existing evidence).
15 See infra Part IV.  The Abu Ghraib photos were, of course, technologically mediated.
But while these came to stand for broader abuses, they did not constitute a leak about a policy
or practice as much as a self-destructive leak by the lower-level practitioners.
16 See infra Part IV.  These include Radack of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on the
Lindh prosecution; NSA whistleblowers Binney, Wiebe, Loomis, Roark, and Drake; AT&T
leaker Klein; DOJ and CIA leakers of the PSP, Tamm and Tice, alongside Snowden and Man-
ning.  The unclear cases include Kirakou, depending on whether his prosecution is interpreted
as retaliatory for disclosure of waterboarding, and Leibowitz, where there is disagreement
about the contents of the disclosures.  Of the remaining three cases prosecuted: Kim and Ster-
ling appear to be garden variety leakers of the long-standing Washington model, swept up in
the present leak investigation mood, while the Lawrence leak to the American Israeli Public
Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”), often discussed together with the others, is more in the realm
of espionage for allies than press leaks.
17 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 13, at 71–72.
18 See id. at 75.
19 See Pozen, supra note 14, at 515.284 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
and unchecked expansion of the national security establishment itself.  Seen
in that light, aggressive prosecutions are merely a symptom of the self-same
post-9/11 national security overreach that instigated the legitimacy crisis:
they manifest the government’s need to shield its controversial actions from
public scrutiny and debate.
Criminal liability for leaking and publishing classified materials is usu-
ally discussed in terms of a conflict between high-level values: security and
democracy.20  Here, I propose that the high-level abstraction obscures the
fact that “national security” is, first and foremost, a system of organizations
and institutions, subject to all the imperfections and failures of all other or-
ganizations.  Considering that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(“SSCI”) excoriated the CIA for groupthink failures in the lead up to the
invasion of Iraq,21 and again for its failures and dissembling in conducting its
torture interrogation program,22 it would be na¨ ıve beyond credulity to be-
lieve that the CIA, NSA, FBI, and Pentagon are immune to the failure dy-
namics that pervade every other large organization, from state bureaucracies
to telecommunications providers, from automobile manufacturers to univer-
sities.  When organizations that have such vast powers over life and death as
well as human and civil rights, the risks of error, incompetence, and malfea-
sance are immeasurably greater than they are for these other, more workaday
organizations.  The Maginot Line did not make France more secure from
Germany and neither torture nor the invasion of Iraq, with its enormous
human, economic, and strategic costs, made America safer from terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, or rogue regimes.  A mechanism for identify-
ing and disrupting the organizational dynamics that lead to such strategic
errors is necessary for any system of government, and in a democracy that
mechanism is the principle of civilian control: fundamental questions of war
and peace require public understanding and public decision.
Secrecy insulates self-reinforcing internal organizational dynamics
from external correction.  In countering this tendency, not all leaks are of the
same fabric.  “War story”-type leaks that make an administration look good
or are aimed to shape public opinion in favor of an already-adopted strategy
or to manipulate support for one agency over another, trial balloons, and so
forth, are legion.23  While these offer the public color and texture from inside
the government and are valuable to the press, they do not offer a productive
counterweight to internal systemic failures and errors.  Some leaks, however,
provide a critical mechanism for piercing the national security system’s
20 See Benjamin Wittes, Against a Crude Balance: Platform Security and the Hostile Sym-
biosis Between Liberty and Security, BROOKINGS I NST. (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.brook-
ings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/21-platform-security-wittes.
21 See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE 108TH CONGRESS, U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP. NO. 108-
301, at 4–7 (2004).
22 See 160 CONG. REC. S1487-91 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2014) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein).
23 See Pozen, supra note 14, at 565–73, for a typology of the normal, “run-of-the-mill”
leaks and “pleaks.”2014] A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 285
echo-chamber, countering self-reinforcing information cascades, groupthink,
and cognitive biases that necessarily pervade any closed communications
system.  It is this type of leak, which exposes and challenges core systemic
behaviors, that has increased in this past decade, as it did in the early 1970s.
These leaks are primarily driven by conscience, and demand accountability
for systemic error, incompetence, or malfeasance.  Their critical checking
function derives from the fact that conscience is uncorrelated with well-be-
haved organizational processes.  Like an electric fuse, accountability leaks,
as we might call them, blow when the internal dynamics of the system reach
the breaking point of an individual with knowledge, but without authority.
They are therefore hard to predict, and function like surprise inspections that
keep a system honest.24  By doing so, these leaks serve both democracy and
security.  This failsafe view of whistleblowing is hardly unique to national
security.  American law in general embraces whistleblowing as a critical
mechanism to address the kinds of destructive organizational dynamics that
lead to error, incompetence, and abuse.  In healthcare, financial, food and
drug, or consumer product industries; in state and federal agencies, through-
out the organizational ecosystem, whistleblowers are protected from retalia-
tion and often provided with financial incentives to expose wrongs they have
seen and subject the organizations in which they work to public or official
scrutiny.25  Whistleblowing is seen as a central pillar to address government
corruption and failure throughout the world.26  Unless one believes that the
national security establishment has a magical exemption from the dynamics
that lead all other large scale organizations to error, then whistleblowing
must be available as a critical arrow in the quiver of any democracy that
seeks to contain the tragic consequences that follow when national security
organizations make significant errors or engage in illegality or systemic
abuse.
Aggressive prosecution of national security whistleblowers and ac-
countability leaks threatens to undermine the checking function that
whistleblowing provides.  To address this threat, I propose that Congress
adopt a new Public Accountability Defense as a general criminal defense, on
24 I purposefully avoid the term “whistleblowing,” although “accountability leaks” aim at
that kind of leak, because the regulatory processes for internal whistleblowing threaten to
cabin the debate to what would be legal under the existing whistleblower protection regime.
Another way of reading “accountability leaks” would be to simply say “whistleblowing,” but
read this term capaciously, rather than merely limiting it to the existing legal definitions.
25 See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16
(1989); Other Workplace Standards: Whistleblower and Retaliation Protections, DEP’TO F  LA-
BOR, http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/whistle.htm (last accessed Feb. 12, 2014).  The De-
partment of Health and Human Services provides substantial financial incentives to individuals
who expose Medicare and Medicaid fraud. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2012); HHS Would
Increase Rewards for Reporting Fraud to Nearly $10 Million, DEP’TO F  HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/04/20130424a.html.
26 See  e.g.,  TRANSPARENCY I NTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL P RINCIPLES FOR
WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION (November 2013), available at http://www.transparency.org/
whatwedo/pub/international_principles_for_whistleblower_legislation.286 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
the model of the necessity defense.27  The defense would be available to
individuals who violate a law on the reasonable belief that by doing so they
will expose to public scrutiny substantial violations of law or substantial
systemic error, incompetence, or malfeasance even where it falls short of
formal illegality.  It is most important to the leakers themselves, but would
also be available to journalists and others who participate in disseminating
the leaked information.  It would provide a defense not only against specific
criminal provisions protecting classified materials, but also against any
charge brought for actions arising out of the same set of facts involved in the
leak.  Part III outlines the details.  The basic model requires: (a) reasonable
belief that exposure discloses a substantial violation of law or substantial
systemic error, incompetence, or malfeasance, (b) mitigation to avoid caus-
ing imminent, articulable, substantial harm that outweighs the benefit of dis-
closure, and (c) communication to a channel likely to result in actual
exposure to the public.  The defense introduces a presumption of reasonable-
ness where disclosed government actions can reasonably be characterized as
grave violations of human rights, as substantial violations of civil rights or
the constitutional order, as surveillance practices, or as decisions or abuses
concerning other major life-threatening acts (primarily in war and public
health).28  The significance of the disclosed violations is the most important
factor, and could dominate the outcome even where other elements, in par-
ticular harm mitigation, are weaker.  Like any criminal defense, the proposal
retains most of the deterrent effect of criminalization and places the risk of
unavailability of the defense on the defendant.  Moreover, full whistleblower
protection would require more robust protections to avoid “punishment by
process,”29 most importantly a private right of action against abusive prose-
cutors and an attenuation of the prosecutors’ qualified immunity, but these
broader remedies are beyond the scope of this article.  While incomplete, a
formalized defense would nevertheless help restore an understanding upset
by recent leak prosecutions: that where a person takes substantial personal
risk reasonably calculated to inform the public about substantial abuses of
government power, the state should correct itself, not the person who blew
the whistle.  The structure of the defense, in particular the requirement that
the judge in the criminal case have an opportunity to pass on the legality or
abusiveness of the exposed practices, should offer some deterrent to prose-
cutions of whistleblowers who expose practices that in fact raise substantial
legal questions or systemic abuse.
27 Model Penal Code Section 3.02(1).
28 I base this list on the OPEN J USTICE S OC’Y I NITIATIVE, GLOBAL P RINCIPLES ON N A-
TIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION (TSHWANE PRINCIPLES) (2013), available
at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/global-principles-national-security-
and-freedom-information-tshwane-principles, which, although tailored to questions of classifi-
cation, freedom of information law, and whistleblowing, offers a carefully considered standard
against which to measure other proposals in the field.
29 MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1992).2014] A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 287
Part I outlines the critical system-correction role that leaks play in regu-
lating information flow between the national security system and other sys-
tems in democratic society, once one understands the “security/democracy”
tension in terms of the interaction of fallible institutional-organizational sys-
tems.  Part II illustrates the theoretical framework with a description of the
bulk data collection programs since September 11, 2001 and the ways in
which leaks complemented highly imperfect formal oversight in providing
correction.  Part III describes the proposed Public Accountability Defense.
Part IV examines twenty-two instances of leaks that resulted in prosecution
or constituted whistleblowing or accountability leaks, from World War II to
Snowden, suggesting that my proposal mostly comports with historical reso-
lution of past events, although these past resolutions have been haphazard,
rather than intentional.
I. BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY, SECRECY AND SECURITY
A. The National Security Bureaucracy and Public Opinion:
A Systems Approach
The question of secrecy and transparency in matters of national security
is usually treated as a tension between security and democracy.30  Discussion
at that level of abstraction obscures more than it reveals, because national
security and public accountability operate as practical social systems, not as
values or broad interests divorced from the practices they describe.  Both
security and democracy are social practices instantiated in particular organi-
zations and institutions31 that form a system.  By “system” I mean routinized
interactions among organizations and institutions, objects and processes,
technical platforms, and conceptual frameworks that provide agents with af-
fordances and constraints.  Systems set the parameters that shape the availa-
ble observations of the state of the world, the range of possible actions, the
valuations of competing actions and outcomes, and the outcomes of different
actions in the practical domain in which they operate.32  “Secrecy” and
30 See generally Wittes, supra note 20.
31 I loosely follow the distinction made by DOUGLASS N ORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1991), but use a definition that follows the
understanding of organizational sociology.  By “organizations” I mean a set of routinized
interactions among individuals, objects, and processes that coordinate the habits and practices
of a defined set of individuals toward defined outcomes.  A school, General Motors, the Penta-
gon, or the CIA is an organization.  By “institutions” I mean more-or-less formalized instruc-
tions for the interaction among agents and organizations.  Laws and regulations, well-
understood norms, technical standards, are all “institutions.”  For intuitive reading, “organiza-
tions” should be read to mean a normal English understanding of the term, and “institutions”
should be read as laws, norms, or their equivalents.
32 The approach is related to the work of Niklas Luhmann and his school of thought. See
generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY (1982).  Exploration of the
differences must await a later paper.  In general, my focus here differs from a Luhmannian
approach in that it (1) focuses on the ways in which systems overlap, interpenetrate, and colo-
nize each other; (2) sees individuals as agents able to nudge, tug, and navigate within and288 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
“transparency” are terms that describe the way one class of individuals and
organizations shape the information flow both within and across the bounda-
ries of the systems they occupy so as to pursue certain goals, exert power
over individuals and organizations (shaping their beliefs, preferences, con-
straints, actions, and outcomes), both within the system and in neighboring
systems, and resist the efforts of others to exert power over them.
The practical translation of this systems conception to national security
is simple.  “National security” is the system made up of state bureaucracies
(the Pentagon, CIA, NSA, National Security Council (“NSC”), etc.) and
market bureaucracies (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Booz Allen Hamilton, Hal-
liburton).  Moreover, as Aziz Huq has explored in great detail with regard to
the state actors, each of these discrete agencies and actors is itself a contin-
gent, complex outgrowth of its own history and represents a discrete force in
a constellation of forces, rather than a well-behaved “unit” in a coherent,
well-controlled system.33  This system deploys various ideas or concepts,
like “national security” or “secrecy,” to pursue goals and acquire resources
(about four percent of GDP, or one-sixth of federal spending34), and a labor
force of about one percent of the population of the United States who work
inside the Department of Defense (“DOD”)35 with a similar number working
on the market side of the system.36  It uses secrecy to segment information
flows about its structure and functions to allow it to project power in other
systems and resist their incursions.  Debates over secrecy and democracy
involve disagreements over whether the actual information segmentation
practices of the national security system act primarily to project power into
what we consider “legitimate” targets—its parallels in other countries or
non-state armed groups—or into systems we want to insulate from the
power of the national security system: public opinion and the constitutional
order.  The actual leak cases of the past half century reveal that the secrecy
protected in those cases was intended to project power into the American
public sphere, although always defended as protecting power projection onto
legitimate targets.
between systems in pursuit of goals, principles, and purposes in whose definition they have a
normatively-significantly role (that is, they are autonomous, albeit situated, agents); and (3) is
oriented toward normative evaluation.
33 Aziz Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV. 887,
904–18 (2012).
34 See  OFFICE OF M GMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL T ABLES, TABLE 3.1: OUTLAYS BY
SUPERFUNCTION AND FUNCTION 1940–2018, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist03z1.xls.  Other tables available at http://www.white
house.gov/omb/budget/HISTORICALS.
35 DOD 101: An Introductory Overview of the Department of Defense, U.S. DEP’TO F
DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/about/dod101.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
36 Jennifer Rizzo, Defense Cuts: The Jobs Numbers Game, CNN (Sep. 22, 2011, 10:44
AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/22/defense-cuts-the-jobs-numbers-game/.2014] A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 289
B. Leaks as Corrective for Organizational, Informational, and
Cognitive Imperfection
Once we abandon “national security” as an abstract concept and re-
place it with the actual system of organizations and institutions inhabited by
human beings within and outside government, the question of leaks and
whistleblowing becomes a question of system design.  In particular, the
question becomes designing the information flow mechanism between the
national security system and at least two other systems: the constitutional
order (those parts of Congress, the Judiciary, and the Presidency that are not
part of the national security system) and public opinion.
Across a wide range of government agencies and private companies,
the basic model of whistleblowing sees the individual insider as a critical
corrective to the dynamics of organizations.37  The model sees organizations
as prone to error, incompetence, and abuse.  Organizations control their own
information flows to other systems so as to avoid the other systems exerting
power to shape the practices arrived at through the internal dynamics of the
organization.  Whistleblowers create an alternative information channel.
Whistleblowers are an important design element because their decision to
open a new channel is uncorrelated with the internal practices, habits, and
routines of the organization that caused the wrong.  Whistleblowing, includ-
ing leaking to the press to harness the system of public opinion, breaks
through the managed information flows and provides external systems with
the information they need to act on practices that the managed information
flows underwrote.
The national security establishment has long been an exception to
whistleblower protection, in particular whistleblowing in external channels
that activate public opinion.  Whistleblower protection came late to national
security;38 it does not cover civilian contractors, it limits external disclosure
to Congress, and even then it gives national security agency heads the oppor-
tunity to resist disclosure.39  In other words, for national security, current law
protects secrecy at the expense of external review, even at the cost of secur-
ing bureaucratic independence from democratic accountability.  The facially
obvious reason is that revealing information that the national security estab-
lishment deems secret can have negative consequences such that the benefits
of disclosure, generally thought worthwhile in less life-critical contexts than
national security, do not in this context outweigh the costs of error, incompe-
tence, and malfeasance within the system.  Once stated in this form, the ob-
vious counterargument emerges.  To paraphrase Clemenceau, national
security is too important to be left to national security insiders.40
37 See supra note 25.
38 See Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. app. 3
§ 8H (2012).
39 See id. at § 8H(d)(2).
40 John Hampden Jackson, CLEMENCEAU AND THE THIRD REPUBLIC 228 (1946).290 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
If national security is so critical, then illegality, error, incompetence,
and malfeasance are all the more important to identify and correct.  The
generals who designed and implemented the Maginot Line were all patriots;
J. Edgar Hoover, legendary founding director of the FBI, was a stalwart of
the national security establishment.  The former led to the collapse of France
in the Second World War.41  The latter built a system of domestic spying and
influence so powerful that it remained untouched during his life but was
dismantled and utterly repudiated within a few years of his death, while his
reign at the FBI became a standard reference point for abuse of power in
America.42  These are extreme but not exceptional historical examples.  The
national security establishment has no magical exemption from the dynamics
that characterize all large organizations.  Therefore there is no reason to be-
lieve that the damages of disclosure will systematically outweigh organiza-
tional failures and abuses, only that both sides of the equation may have very
large values.  The history of actual national security leaks, certainly those
that resulted in substantial public exposure described in Part IV, overwhelm-
ingly supports the contrary conclusion.
The literature on organizational, information, and cognitive imperfec-
tion is vast.  Diverse lines of work in economics emphasize the tension be-
tween individual self-interest of agents and the organizational goal as a
whole.  New institutionalists are concerned with shirking and organizational
costs,43 while rational choice scholars are concerned with capture problems
on the public organization side,44 and principal-agent problems on the pri-
vate side.45  In any of its versions, economics suggests that national security
organizations will be subject to influence by industry players who seek deci-
sions that will line their pockets, that revolving door concerns will push
high-level decision makers to adopt positions that fit industry needs, and
that, at all levels of the security bureaucracy, individuals will try to cover
their failures, make decisions that advance their own careers independent of
what is best for the country, or try to expand their personal power and
fiefdoms independently of whether doing so serves the broad organizational
mandate or national interest.  Recognizing these dynamics does not require a
special distrust of military or national security establishments.  It merely re-
quires that we recognize that corporals and captains, colonels and generals,
agents and deputy directors are people too, people operating in a large bu-
reaucracy just like so many other employees, mid-level managers, and exec-
utives elsewhere in public service or the private sector.  Economics,
organizational sociology, management studies, and public administration all
41 See generally H.W. KAUFMANN & J.E. KAUFMANN,F ORTRESS FRANCE: THE MAGINOT
LINE AND FRENCH DEFENSES IN W ORLD W AR II (2006).
42 See The Truth About J. Edgar Hoover, TIME, Dec. 22, 1975, at 18.
43 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,T HE E CONOMIC I NSTITUTIONS OF C APITALISM
(1986).
44 See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. STUD. 3 (1971).
45 See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Man-
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include work that explores the failures introduced by practices, habits, and
routines that prevent learning about the conditions in the world and adjust-
ment in the face of change and uncertainty, and they all study approaches to
overcome these failures or improve performance that are relevant in the na-
tional security sector.46
Literature on information dynamics and cognitive bias reinforces the
idea that closed organizations will go awry systematically and predictably.47
Substantial work establishes that groups tend to feed back their own beliefs
into themselves, reinforce majority positions, and fail to challenge consensus
beliefs—a process falling under the moniker groupthink.48  Cass Sunstein
described, for example, how the SSCI specifically saw groupthink as a cen-
tral attribute of the CIA’s failure in evaluating the threat of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, a failure that contributed to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.49
Aziz Huq surveyed the literature that explores the cognitive dynamics that
emphasize security, predictability, control, and a resistance to opposition and
uncertainty associated specifically with fear of terrorism.50  These dynamics
are exacerbated in hierarchical systems because advancement in these orga-
nizations requires that superiors not be antagonized.  The “fundamental rules
of bureaucratic life”51 are at their core concerned with information flows:
insulating bosses from criticism and information that would threaten to
destabilize their judgment in front of subordinates.  Even more fundamen-
tally, error and biased interpretation of specific observations, background
facts, and baseline presumptions are all subject to the dynamics of motivated
reasoning.52  That is, our most basic cognitive processes drive us to interpret
the world and our observations to fit our existing understanding of the world.
Finally, individuals in the national security system oversample threats and
are involved in a system dedicated to avoid large unknown losses.  Extensive
work on the availability heuristic, loss aversion, and probability neglect sug-
gests that insiders to the national security establishment will overstate the
threats against which they are defending and the threat associated with
46 See Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Government, in THE O XFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 168–87 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011); see generally Paul DiMag-
gio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Ra-
tionality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983); Charles Sabel & William
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011).
47 See Cass Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information
Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964–67 (2005).
48 See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS,G ROUPTHINK 174–75 (2nd ed. 1983).
49 Sunstein, supra note 47, at 965–66.
50 See Huq, supra note 33, at 934–40.
51 ROBERT JACKELL,M ORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 115 (2009)
(“(1) You never go around your boss. (2) You tell your boss what he wants to hear, even when
your boss claims that he wants dissenting views. (3) If your boss wants something dropped,
you drop it. (4) You are sensitive to your boss’s wishes so that you anticipate what he wants;
you don’t force him, in other words, to act as a boss. (5) Your job is not to report something
that your boss does not want reported, but rather to cover it up. You do your job and you keep
your mouth shut.”).
52 See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004).292 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
leaks.53  When a system whose insularity and secrecy disable external criti-
cism, combined with individual cognitive and group information dynamics
that contribute to poor diagnosis of the state of the world, substantial errors
are inevitable.  When this system is as large and complex as the national
security system, and when the stakes of errors are so high, these dynamics
reliably lead to periodic tragedy, abuse, or both.
Moreover, there are certain characteristics that make the national secur-
ity system even more susceptible to the standard set of organizational deci-
sion-making errors, and less susceptible to correction.54  Secrecy is pervasive
in the national security system and prevents even internal sub-divisions from
knowing enough to offer alternative views.  It is linked to long and uncertain
causal chains that make identifying the error or predicting its unintended
consequences all the more difficult.  The outcomes are not regular and
smooth, such that outsiders and insiders can observe an external indicator
such as a stock price, inflation rate, or employment statistics, to raise the
alarm about a policy going wrong before it results in catastrophe or major
abuse.55  And finally, the mystique and cultural importance of patriotism
make critique much harder to interpose, and much easier to ignore, than in
more mundane areas that do not benefit from such strong emotional pre-
sumptions of worthiness.  Mission critical organizations understand this and
try to implement mechanisms to counteract the effect.  From morbidity and
mortality conferences in hospitals56 to near-miss assessments on aircraft car-
riers,57 organizations that must retain secrecy and confidentiality create inter-
nal models that encourage critical examination and mimic open criticism.
Red teams in the military (like the Devil’s Advocate in canonization) are
among the canonical examples of mechanisms oriented to achieve that goal.
The point is not that there is something inherently and particularly wrong
about the military or national security systems as such.  The point is that,
effective as these internal efforts may be in many cases, they cannot truly
escape the dynamics that lead to error.  Open criticism from outsiders is also
imperfect.  But the sources of imperfection in open system criticism are un-
correlated with those of the internal dynamics, and it is that independence
between the sources and forms of imperfection that creates the benefits of
layering both internal and external systems—nowhere more so than in deci-
sions of life and death.
Once we reject the implausible assumption that the particular organiza-
tions charged with delivering on national security are exempt from the dy-
namics that characterize all other organizations in all other sectors, and all
other collective sense-making processes, then the question we face with na-
53 See generally Cass Sunstein, Fear and Liberty, 71 SOC. RESEARCH: INT’L Q. 967 (2004).
54 I owe these insights to Aziz Huq.
55 Huq, supra note 33, at 930–34.
56 See generally Jay Orlander and Graeme Fincke, Morbidity and Mortality Conference,
18 J. INTERN. MED. 656 (2003).
57 See Charles F. Sabel, A Real Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABO-
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tional security leaks and whistleblowing is never abstract but always con-
crete.  How much more error, incompetence, and malfeasance will we see in
the critical area of national security by reducing whistleblowing through ag-
gressive criminal enforcement of the Espionage Act,58 the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act,59 and other related laws, as compared to how much damage
is national security likely to suffer from occasional major leaks if we create a
well-structured defense for national security whistleblowers, and more gen-
erally if we bring national security whistleblower protection law more in line
with whistleblower protection elsewhere in American law?
The problem with secrecy and security in a democracy runs deeper than
correcting discrete errors or redressing instances of malfeasance.  Secrecy
goes to the heart of how “security” is defined. In particular it shapes
whether security is defined along the contours of internally derived defini-
tions of needs, beliefs, and actions within the national security system, or
whether what counts as security is defined by public opinion.
Security is not a self-defining concept.  The set of practices and rou-
tines we are willing to consider as security is the core decision that defines
where “security” ends and “repression” begins.  Bruce Schneier quipped
colorfully that we could prevent all future plane bombings and hijackings:
“simply ground all the aircraft.”60  If we encountered some other continental
republic making such a choice we wouldn’t call them “secure,” we would
call them “paranoid” or “defeated.”  We could prevent almost all future
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil if we required every person to carry an internal
passport and require clearance of all their movements by an antiterrorism
unit, arresting any person observed in a place or time for which they were
not pre-cleared.  We would not call such a society “secure,” we would call it
“repressive.”   Secrecy of national security measures prevents democracy
from playing precisely the role for which it was designed: managing hard
choices about what to do and how much of it, to protect what, at what cost,
to which other values.61
In a democracy, open debate and contestation provide a critical correc-
tive to the destructive information and social dynamics of insulated organi-
zations.  Secrecy is never appropriate to insulate the current set of
organizational practices of the national security system from democratic
challenge regarding the basic external set of questions of what practices con-
stitute security, and what constitutes repression or defeat.  The level of risk
we want to live with, the practices we are willing to endorse as a society in
the name of security, and the level and forms of power we are willing to
concentrate and locate within organizations charged with protecting national
58 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1996).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
60 BRUCE SCHNEIER,B EYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCER-
TAIN W ORLD 17 (2006).
61 See Gene Spafford, Security Through Obscurity, CTR. FOR EDUC. & RESEARCH IN INFO.
ASSURANCE & SEC. (Sept. 3, 2008), http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/site/blog/post/security_
through_obscurity/ (explaining the origin of the term and qualifying its scope).294 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
security—given the broad normative commitment to the set of values shared
across a wide range of democratic societies in the early twenty-first cen-
tury—lie at the very heart of the definition of security.  This security func-
tion is merely a manifestation of the more general point: open society is a
culture and set of institutions that harness the error correction, experimenta-
tion, and learning practices necessary for a society to adapt continuously to a
highly uncertain, complex, ever-changing environment.
C. “But What About Plain Old Security?”:  Lessons From
Computer Security
Even if we understand that the national security establishment can
make mistakes, there remains the argument that secrecy is vital to security;
that the price of transparency is too high.  The argument gains force from the
fact that understanding how security is enhanced by secrecy is intuitively
trivial.  A military unit is on its way to execute an attack on an enemy, and
someone tips off the enemy who escapes or ambushes the troops.  This is
classic “transports on the way” secrecy that could be subject to prior re-
straint under the Pentagon Papers case.62  Only one case of leaking to the
press has ever involved a risk of this type: the case of Morton Seligman, who
leaked decoded Japanese naval dispatches in the midst of World War II, and
whose publication after Midway could have disclosed that the United States
had broken Japanese naval codes.63  This is the threat most legitimately inter-
jected against leaks, but in all but that one World War II case, it has been pat
hyperbole in criticisms of press leaks.  Private Manning’s disclosures to
Wikileaks, for example, were denounced as likely to cause deaths, a claim
that the Pentagon was not willing to repeat when asked for a formal assess-
ment by the Senate Armed Services Committee.64  Claims of secrecy of this
sort normally assert power in the relationship between the national security
system and the public opinion system.
Understanding how secrecy can undermine  security requires more
work.  A brief diversion into computer security will help.  Computer security
is among the most complex systems-security challenges we face today.  Yet
the standard understanding, popularized through the term “no security
through obscurity,”65 is that secrecy is an imperfect and often self-defeating
source of security.  One of the most basic “general information security
principles” is: “Open Design—System security should not depend on the
62 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
63 See Lawrence B. Brennan, Spilling the Secret – Captain Morton T. Seligman, U.S. Navy
(Retired), U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1919, UNIVERSAL SHIP CANCELLATION SOCIETY LOG,
Jan. 2013, available at http://www.uscs.org/society-archives/uscs-log-society-journal/.  The
Japanese Navy never made the connection, and the risk never materialized.  Id.
64 See Benkler, supra note 10, at 324 (describing claims about the effects of the leaks and
Secretary Gates’s response to Senator Levin’s request for confirmation).
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secrecy of the implementation or its components,”66 a principle recognized
since the early days of computer security.67  This doesn’t mean that secrecy
offers no security, but that “the fewer secrets a system has, the more secure
it is.”68
Secrecy involves three distinct weaknesses.  First, secrets are hard to
keep.  The more a system depends on secrecy as opposed to robust design,
and the more its characteristics must be known to more people so they can
work with it, the more susceptible it is to failure because it leans too heavily
on that relatively weak link.  Second, when secrets cover many facets of
what makes a security system work, they tend to be interdependent and hard
to change without changing the whole system.  This makes security systems
“brittle.”  They break when the secret is disclosed.  A system with few
secrets and few dependencies can change the information revealed to negate
the revelation.  If a password is revealed, it can be changed.  If the core
design is weak and its defense depends on secrecy, once the secret is out, the
system is vulnerable.  Ask Darth Vader.
The third problem with secrecy is its most important for our purposes:
secrets undermine error correction.  No system is perfect.  None is perfectly
designed in the first place, and systems, particularly complex systems that
interact with an uncertain and changing environment, become less perfect as
time passes: conditions change, threats change, and unanticipated interac-
tions among components emerge.  Error detection, resilience, healing, and
experimentation with alternative solutions are critical to a well-functioning
system.  Secrecy severely limits the range and diversity of sources of insight
for diagnosis and solution.
The point about error detection has broader implications for the rela-
tionship between the national security system and public opinion.  Open,
democratic societies are not weaker for their openness; they are stronger for
it.69  There are certainly inconvenient truths; backroom deals that have to be
done, diplomatic channels that must be kept open.  Public opinion can be
fickle, leaders must sometimes take a longer view than present public senti-
ment will allow, and perfect transparency can be no panacea unless one
imagines a utopia in which all members of the public are rational, well-
informed, and patient.  So yes, there are always troop movements that must
be kept secret and much, much more.  But there is also ambition and narrow-
mindedness, interest, groupthink, and the yes-man mentality of the bureau-
cratic mindset.  What has made open societies successful is their ability to
learn, experiment, and adapt in a persistently uncertain and changing envi-
66 KAREN SCARFONE ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION
800-123, GUIDE TO GENERAL SERVER SECURITY 2–4 (2008), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/nistpubs/800-123/SP800-123.pdf.
67 See generally Jerome H. Saltzer & Michael D. Schroeder, The Protection of Information
in Computer Systems, 63 PROC. INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC E NGINEERS 1278 (1975),
available at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1451869.
68 SCHNEIER, supra note 60, at 128.
69 See generally PAUL STARR, FREEDOM’S POWER: THE HISTORY AND PROMISE OF LIBER-
ALISM (2008) (a historical survey of the relative strength of open societies).296 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
ronment.  On a much grander scale than computer security, secrecy under-
mines the most basic features by which open societies learn, question, and
adapt; these are the very foundations of security in democratic society, and
are congruent with, rather than in conflict with, the foundations of liberty in
these societies.70  It would be a mistake to imagine that the Counter Intelli-
gence Program (“COINTELPRO”), the secret domestic spying program that
the FBI ran against domestic dissenters (including leaders and activists in the
civil rights and antiwar movements71) made America stronger and more se-
cure at a cost to freedom and democracy.  COINTELPRO made Americans
less secure and less free, and less able to engage in the kind of criticism that
helps us learn to distinguish between real, core threats to the lives and well-
being of Americans and manufactured threats tailored to fit the views of
those who sought to disrupt dissent.
II. BULK SURVEILLANCE AFTER 9/11: A CASE STUDY IN THE
LIMITATIONS OF CLOSED SYSTEMS AND THE ROLE OF LEAKS IN
ENABLING THE OPEN SYSTEM OF PUBLIC OPINION
AS A CHECK ON POWER
The trajectory of the bulk surveillance system, in particular telephony
metadata, over the dozen years from its implementation in October 2001
until early 2014 provides a lesson in the risks and failures of even well-
designed closed systems like the post-Watergate delegated oversight sys-
tem.72  In particular, it shows how classification is wielded by actors in the
national security system to defeat agents who inhabit the democratic over-
sight and independent review systems, the systemic limitations of “proper
channels” accountability once these proper channels are severed from the
ability to receive public criticism and harness public opinion to counter the
70 This approach shares a basic commitment to the possibility of external evaluation of
moral and practical “correctness” of collective actions with epistemic views of democracy.
See generally David Estlund, Beyond Fairness and Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE D EMOC-
RACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); Joshua
Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26 (1986); Jules Coleman & John
Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6 (1986).  As will become clear, my com-
mitment to living with endemic imperfection and uncertainty requires a more thoroughgoing
tentativeness about the epistemic quality of the processes than Estlund’s, and my emphasis on
public opinion goes well beyond the problem of voting central to Cohen, Coleman, and Fer-
ejohn.  It most closely approximates Dewey’s experimentalist view of democracy. See Charles
Sabel, Dewey, Democracy and Democratic Experimentalism 9 CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 35,
38–44 (2012).
71 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 10–12 (1976), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf.
72 By “delegated oversight” I refer to the system put in place by the post-Watergate re-
forms, see generally Donohue, supra note 2, which took select members of Congress as part of
select committees, select judges, as part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(“FISC”), and select executive branch organs, like the agency Inspectors General or the Pri-
vacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) and delegated to them authority to ful-
fill in secret tasks usually filled by all members of Congress and the Judiciary in processes
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power of the national security system over matters understood as within its
sphere, and the critical role that individual dissenters played as a corrective
to the failures of the national security bureaucracy by rewiring the informa-
tion flows between the systems.
A. The PSP from October 2001 Until 2007
Perhaps technological change to a ubiquitously networked, computa-
tionally-impregnated society and economy would have driven us to bulk sur-
veillance without the attack on the World Trade Center.73  Certainly, private
companies implement pervasive surveillance on their own systems to im-
prove marketing, and other countries, like China or Russia, are developing
parallel practices facing different threat models and adhering to different
conceptions of government power.  But for purposes of understanding the
particular story of how bulk surveillance developed in the American consti-
tutional and political context, one must turn to the weeks after September 11,
2001.74  Faced with the most devastating attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Har-
bor, the Bush Administration charged the NSA with creating a system that
would allow early detection and prevention of future attacks.  In response,
the NSA developed, and the President authorized, the PSP,75 one component
of which was later disclosed and criticized as the “warrantless wiretapping”
program.
Because that program required cooperation from telecommunications
firms, the Administration sought Attorney General (“AG”) sign-off on the
legality of collecting telephone records in bulk without warrants.  Approval
by the AG would provide a mark of legitimacy and coax private companies
to comply without court order.  As part of this process, the Office of Legal
Counsel (“OLC”) had to provide independent analysis of the programs pro-
posed.  This first opportunity for oversight, internal to the Administration,
was anchored in the historical professional independence of OLC.  In this
73 By “surveillance” I mean the collection of information about patterns of behavior that
can be converted into effective action vis-a-vis the subject of the information.  There is some
debate as to whether information collected and stored without a human reading the material
counts as surveillance.  By my practical definition, whether the information is human-read or
not only matters if the system requires human reading in order to have effects; if a marketing
algorithm that targets ads (or more subversively, nudge-type messages) at me based on prior
usage patterns, without ever being touched by a human being, that is surveillance because it
shapes my perception and outcomes through the application of prior observation to present or
future capabilities, opportunities, or configuration I inhabit; if meta-data or for that matter even
only phone book data, if cross-referenced with other kinds of data, can lead to effective action
upon the subject, that is surveillance.  As machine processing becomes better, and automatic
alteration of the information environment of subjects can get integrated better with machine
processed data, the range of practices covered by the term “surveillance” becomes broader.
74 See generally INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’TO F  DEF., DEP’TO F  JUSTICE, CENT. INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, AND THE OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
UNCLASSIFIED R EPORT ON THE P RESIDENT’S S URVEILLANCE P ROGRAM (2009),  available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/report_071309.pdf
[hereinafter FIVE IGS REPORT].
75 Id. at 5.298 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
case, the Administration short-circuited that independence by permitting
only one OLC lawyer, John Yoo, to be read into the programs: to receive
enough information about them to form an opinion.  This meant that only
this particular individual could certify the constitutionality and legality of
the program, and no one else in the hierarchical and peer review systems of
OLC or the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) could see facts that would allow
them to challenge that conclusion.  The opinion that resulted from this rump
process was sufficiently weakly reasoned that as soon as Yoo left DOJ, his
successors began processes to disclaim it.  But for the first two years, se-
crecy insulated the PSP from this core internal, executive branch check.  The
failure of that system in those first two years does not mean it can never
work.  Indeed, the story of the conflict among then-head of OLC, Jack Gold-
smith, Deputy AG James Comey, hospital-bed-bound AG John Ashcroft, and
the White House over DOJ’s refusal to continue to approve the programs
after Yoo left is an exemplary tale of professional integrity playing its check-
ing function.76  The point is that the White House was able to use classifica-
tion to rewire another system—the intersection of professional norms in the
legal profession, and the organizational culture of OLC—in order to circum-
vent its designed checking function.  As the DOJ resisted warrantless wire-
tapping, its functionality was preserved in part by components in the FBI,
formally under the control of the AG, by dramatically increased use of Na-
tional Security Letters.  This practice was later found by the DOJ’s Inspector
General to have violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act77 and
the pertinent Attorney General’s guidelines.78  Few parts of the story so
clearly illustrate that the “systems” cross formal organizational boundaries.
They are functional-sociological entities, not codified organizational rela-
tionships, and the counter-terrorism components of the FBI acted within the
national security system, circumventing parts of the DOJ that function as
elements of the constitutional order system.
Congressionally delegated oversight also existed during this period.  On
October 25, 2001, the White House reported to the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the House Permanent Select Committee, and their counterparts
on the SSCI.79  They apparently raised no objections.80  Given that the pro-
gram was later determined to be illegal and its continuation required sub-
stantial changes to the law, that approval sub silentio should be treated as
failed oversight, rather than as successful oversight and approval.  In March
2004, after OLC and DOJ began to object to the program, the Administra-
tion again briefed a subset of the relevant congressional leadership, “the
Gang of Eight.”81  According to later reports by Attorney General Gonzales,
76 Id. at 20–26.
77 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq.
78 INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’TO F  JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION’S USE OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND OTHER INFORMAL REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS 2
(2010).
79 FIVE IGS REPORT, supra note 74, at 16.
80 Id.
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no one raised objections.82  According to Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, she
did.83  Whether or not private objections were raised, it was not until early
2007, almost six years after launch and three years after the internal DOJ
objections, that the program was abandoned and replaced by new legislation.
In the years since then, the NSA has offered several briefings to a broader
set of congressional representatives.84  But from public statements by con-
gressional representatives, these briefings occur in special secure rooms,
members are not permitted to take notes, and the overwhelming majority of
members do not have staff with the clearance or training to understand the
implications of technical descriptions.85  The result is oversight theater: pub-
lic enactment of the appearance of oversight, rather than real accountability.
Operational secrecy similarly kept the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (“FISC”) on board but in the dark.  Until early 2006, only the chief
judge of the FISC was read into the program.86  Reading a single judge into a
program, while stating that it is absolutely critical to national security and
without the normal process of evidence presentation and skeptical challenge
makes the judicial notification a charade.
The early stages of the PSP provide a crisp example because there is
little debate that at least that part of the program was illegal.  Throughout the
first years of operation, the White House used operational secrecy to shape
the oversight process in ways that insulated the illegal program from effec-
tive challenge.  It short-circuited the professional mechanisms intended to
provide internal independent review within the executive branch, and it per-
mitted the administration to severely constrain the access and possible effec-
tiveness of the two other branches.  The program was only shut down in
early 2007, three years after the personnel changes within the DOJ precipi-
tated its critique, and the FISC was only incorporated into the process in
2006.  These changes followed soon after The New York Times reported on
the program in December 2005, based on leaks by DOJ lawyer Thomas
Tamm87 and the April 2006 revelations by AT&T engineer Mark Klein of the
82 Id. at 23, n.16.
83 Id.
84 See Letter from M. Faith Burton, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Chairmen of the Senate
and House Judiciary Comms. & Senate and House Intelligence Comms. (Mar. 5, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Mar 5 2009 Cover Letter to Chairman
of Intel and Judiciary Committees.pdf; Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Comms. & Senate and House Intelligence
Comms. (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Sep%
203%202009%20Cover%20letter%20to%20Chairman%20of%20the%20Intelligence%20and
%20Judiciary%20Committees.pdf.
85 See Alan Grayson, Op-Ed., Congressional Oversight of the NSA Is a Joke. I Should
Know, I’m in Congress, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2013, 7:45 AM), http://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/nsa-no-congress-oversight; Justin Amash, Congressman,
Lunch Keynote Address at the Cato Institute Conference: NSA Surveillance: What We Know;
What to Do About It (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://www.cato.org/events/nsa-surveillance-
what-we-know-what-do-about-it.
86 FIVE IGS REPORT, supra note 74, at 17.
87 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2005, at A1.300 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
deep tapping that AT&T enabled the NSA to perform.88  Causal claims are
difficult to prove, but timing strongly suggests that public exposure played a
significant role in assuring that the most blatantly illegal aspects of the pro-
gram were abandoned or fixed legislatively.
B. NSA Bulk Surveillance Since 2007
Materials leaked by Snowden or declassified in response to the criti-
cism that followed suggest a similar pattern.  First, as Judge Leon’s Decem-
ber 16, 2013 opinion in Klayman v. Obama89 makes clear, the telephony
metadata program under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act90 may well
violate the Fourth Amendment.91  And yet, from May 2006, when the FISC
began to approve bulk collection orders, until August 2013, apparently in
response to the public outcry over the Snowden revelations, the FISC ap-
pears never to have considered the program’s constitutionality.  Moreover,
the August 2013 opinion92 did not even mention the most pertinent Supreme
Court precedent: United States v. Jones.93  That failure evidences systemic
failure of the secret, ex parte, delegated judicial oversight model.  No prop-
erly briefed judge writing an opinion for publication would have produced
an opinion with such a glaring hole.  Indeed, Judge Pauley’s opinion in
ACLU v. Clapper reaches the same conclusion as did the August 2013 FISC
opinion, but with the benefit of proper briefing and anticipating publication,
the opinion does indeed do the obvious: considers (and rejects) the Jones-
based argument.94  My point, therefore, is not that the telephony metadata
program is necessarily unconstitutional or that it is impossible to write a
competent opinion upholding it.  The point is that for seven years the FISC
did not bother to consider the question, and when it did, its opinion was one-
sided and weak by comparison to opinions issued at the same time by other
courts following the normal process of open court and published opinions.
The weakness of the FISC’s analysis is underscored by the January 23,
2014 report by the PCLOB.95  The report explained in detail why the teleph-
ony meta-data program could not be interpreted as coming under the prece-
dent of Smith v. Maryland,96 and in light of the opinions of five of the
Justices in United States v. Jones likely violated Fourth Amendment under
existing jurisprudence.97  The timing of that report, however, strengthens the
argument that internal mechanisms alone cannot assure proper oversight.
88 See generally Markoff & Shane, supra note 9.
89 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
90 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
91 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. at 9.
92  See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 2013), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf.
93 See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
94 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
95 See generally PCLOB REPORT, supra note 6.
96 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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The PCLOB was created in 2007 as a weak body98 (only the chair is salaried
and authorized to expend funds, while the other four members are volun-
teers).99  It became operational in late May of 2013, days before the
Snowden revelations.100  At least four and a half years of the almost six-year
delay were due to delayed nominations by both Presidents Bush and
Obama.101  These delays suggest that an administration interested in creating
the appearance of oversight, rather than its actuality, can significantly ham-
per executive branch oversight.
While FISC judges did not consider constitutionality, they did work
closely with the NSA to prevent abuses.  The minimal staffing of the FISC,
the technical complexities, the absence of opposing counsel, and the diver-
sity and robustness of the programs that the intelligence community uses
nonetheless limited the court’s effectiveness.  The secrecy and absence of
public pressure puts the judges in a difficult if not impossible situation.  No-
where is this clearer than in opinions that found that the parameters they had
set for collection, such as prohibiting the acquisition of wholly domestic
communications, had been violated systematically.102  In one opinion, Judge
Walton stated that “[t]he minimization procedures proposed by the govern-
ment in each successive application and approved and adopted as binding
orders by the FISC have been so frequently and systematically violated that
it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall BR regime has
never functioned effectively.”103
The same dynamic characterized congressional oversight.  For several
years Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, members of the SSCI, issued
oblique warnings that the Administration’s interpretation of the PATRIOT
Act would shock the American people.104  Their role inside the committee
permitted them access to the information that allowed them to form their
opinion, but the secrecy prevented them from mobilizing public support.
Moreover, as the collection provisions came up for periodic reauthorization,
the NSA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence offered all
members of Congress briefings that, read in hindsight, disclosed the fact of
98 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, 121 Stat. 256 (2007).
99 PRG REPORT, supra note 5, at 193–200.
100 PCLOB REPORT, supra note 6, at 3–4.
101 See id. at 4 (timing of the nominations and votes is blacked out); GARRETT HATCH,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD: NEW
INDEPENDENT A GENCY S TATUS 2  (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL
34385.pdf.
102 Memorandum Opinion, No. [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/fisc_opinion_10.3.2011.pdf.
103 In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, 10–11 (FISA
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785205-pub-march-
2-2009-order-from-fisc.html.  When the court says “BR” it is referring to “Business
Records,” which is to say the materials produced under Section 215.
104 See Letter from Senator Mark Udall & Senator Ron Wyden to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen.
(Mar. 15, 2012), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/325953-85512347-
senators-ron-wyden-mark-udall-letter-to.html.302 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
broad-based metadata collection.105  Perhaps because the briefings were
under conditions that prevented adequate staffing, perhaps because there was
no electoral “angle” for members of Congress who could not reveal the
nature of their objections publicly, the reality is that for years Congress did
nothing to contain or reform the bulk collection programs.  This inaction
stands in stark contrast to the hive-like activity in Congress since the
Snowden disclosures: nineteen bills have been introduced, and a Senate Ju-
diciary Committee inquiry exposed that the telephony metadata program had
not, as the directors of the NSA and National Intelligence publicly claimed,
foiled fifty-four terrorist plots; to the contrary, the 215 program was respon-
sible for, at most, one case, involving the transfer of $8500 to Al Shabaab by
a Somali immigrant,106 a finding later confirmed by the President’s Review
Group (“PRG”).107
The stark discontinuity from years of inaction by any of the three
branches’ internal oversight processes to frenzied activity in all three makes
clear that only the public disclosures and the outrage that followed them, and
nothing else, were at the root of the reform.  Claims to the contrary strain
credulity.
Part of what the story tells us is that transparency is not merely a paral-
lel mechanism of accountability alongside other models.  It is the founda-
tional driver of the successful operation of each of the other systems as well.
Congressional oversight works when members know that the public will
know and judge their actions.  Judicial review works well in open court, but
is hobbled by secrecy that denies judges the benefits of peer review and
public accountability.  And internal executive branch review also functions
differently when insiders act in the dark, with no opportunity to recruit either
public opinion or allies elsewhere in the Administration among those with-
out privileged information access to push back on illegal or grossly mistaken
policies.
III. A PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEFENSE
Leaks are widely used by insiders in both executive and legislative
branches to manage public opinion.108  Their unauthorized character lends
105 See Letter from M. Faith Burton, supra note 84; Letter from Ronald Weich, supra note
84.
106 Compare Four Declassified Examples, U.S. H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON IN-
TELLIGENCE (last visited Mar. 16, 2014), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/1-four-de-
classified-examples-more-50-attacks-20-countries-thwarted-nsa-collection-under-fisa-section#
overlay-context=highlights-june-18-open-hearing-fisa-program,  with Strengthening Privacy
Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Sur-
veillance Programs: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of
John Inglis, Deputy Dir., Nat’l Sec. Agency), available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
post/57811913209/hearing-of-the-senate-judiciary-committee-on (conceding that there was
only one example “that comes close to a but-for example and that’s the case of Basaaly
Moalin”).
107 PRG REPORT, supra note 5, at 104.
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them credibility, and the long tradition of forbearance in prosecutions helps
maintain that credibility: if most leaks were prosecuted, leaks not prosecuted
would come to be seen as sanctioned, and lose their credibility as tools for
shaping public opinion.109  Most normal leaks still are not prosecuted, and
play a small role in securing public accountability.  The defense I propose
here is not concerned with these kinds of leaks.  Instead, I focus on account-
ability leaks: those that expose substantial instances of illegality or gross
incompetence or error in certain classes of particularly important matters
associated with the activities of the national security system.  These kinds of
accountability leaks have been rare, appearing in two periods of significant
crisis: first at the confluence of the Vietnam War and the Cold War with the
anti-war and civil rights movements, and now again in response to some of
the more extreme post-9/11 tactics and strategies.  While rare, they represent
instances where leaks have played a substantial role in undermining threats
from the national security establishment to the constitutional order of the
United States.
Accountability leaks are a critical safety valve for such moments.  Un-
like normal leaks, which preserve a space for leaking useful to leaders in the
national security system and therefore enjoy a certain laxity in enforce-
ment,110 accountability leaks that expose systemic illegality, incompetence,
error, or malfeasance challenge the system they expose in ways that make
the leakers the target of heightened enforcement.  Because the personal risk
to the leaker in such critical leaks is high and will remain so even assuming
adoption of a defense, national security accountability leaks to the press will
continue to be rare.  While human motivation is complex, and leaks of con-
science are likely to come from individuals who already have a highly
prosocial motivational structure, leakers are unlikely to be systematically
impervious to the threat of aggressive prosecutions.  Therefore, a defense
likely will lower the threshold of a decision to leak, but only to a degree.
Accountability leaks will only occur when the incongruity between what the
system is doing and what conscience dictates to individual insiders is so
great that they become willing to take that risk, and a defense would some-
what shrink the necessary magnitude of that incongruity.  Because individu-
als are diverse in beliefs and sensitivity to the dictates of conscience, the
exact locus of such a breach is highly uncertain, and most importantly, un-
correlated with where that individual is located in the decision-making pro-
cess.  It is this fact—that conscience is uncorrelated with well-behaved
oversight—that gives leaks their unique pressure-valve role.  Internal mech-
anisms may feel like they are working well to insiders because of the inter-
nal error dynamics of groups, even when they are, in fact, failing.  Where the
internal oversight mechanisms are functioning well, the pressure on the pres-
sure valve will remain low.  When those internal mechanisms fail, but insid-
109 Id. at 562.
110 See id.304 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
ers continue to see them as succeeding (as they did with the surveillance and
torture programs) the pressure valve of conscience is most likely to come
into play.  The fact that leaks are unpredictable from the perspective of insid-
ers requires those insiders to operate on the assumption that if they do some-
thing sufficiently wrong, there is a nontrivial probability that someone,
somewhere, will decide to leak it.  The PRG expressed the restraining force
of this mechanism as the “Front Page Rule.”111 The ungovernability of the
combination of leaker and press makes it less manageable than the regular
oversight system, and more susceptible to different forms of failure than the
failures that caused the legitimacy crisis.  That imperfection, in turn, is the
reason it is appropriate to continue to maintain the baseline criminal sanc-
tions, albeit moderated by the defense.
For decades, the systemic role of leaks was respected by the rarity of
prosecutions.  The recent slew of criminal prosecutions has upset that bal-
ance, and probably reflects the fact that the national security establishment
adopted extremely controversial practices in the wake of the September 11
attacks, measures that flunked the “Front Page Rule” as soon as they were
exposed.  We have extensively discussed bulk surveillance.  The CIA has
been fighting tooth and nail to keep details of the SSCI damning review of
its now-abandoned torture program secret,112 and public exposure of the se-
cret prisons system also led to abandonment of the practices and significant
limitation of rendition programs.113  The greater the incongruity between
what the national security system has developed and what public opinion is
willing to accept,114 the greater the national security establishment’s need to
prevent the public from becoming informed.  The prosecutorial deviation
from past practices is best explained as an expression of the mounting ur-
gency felt inside the national security system to prevent public exposure.
The defense I propose is intended to reverse that prosecutorial deviation.
The proposal offers a framework to provide a criminal defense or sen-
tencing mitigation factor, and is calibrated to protect individuals who release
information of significant public benefit, and, where feasible, only the infor-
mation necessary to inform the public of truly harmful government action.  It
is not intended to protect the much more common, run-of-the-mill national
security leak that simply tells the story of this unit or that, this mission or the
111 PRG REPORT, supra note 5, at 170.  Note that a “Front Page” rule is Machiavellian,
not normative: reasons of state can dictate immoral acts.  The constraint is merely whether they
can be framed so that, if made public, they will not cause a legitimacy crisis that would risk
reversal and loss of power.
112 Spencer Ackerman, CIA and Senators in Bitter Dispute Over Capitol Hill Spying
Claims, THE GUARDIAN (March 5, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
mar/06/cia-and-senators-in-bitter-slanging-match-over-capitol-hill-spying-claims.
113 GOLDSMITH, supra note 13, at 75.
114 By “public opinion” I mean the actual pattern of opinions held by the public, accepting
the outsized role of media elites, persuasion, and demagoguery.  My position neither assumes
nor depends on an ideal public, or a public that has gone through deliberative processes that
make it more rational. See generally BRUCE A CKERMAN & JAMES F ISHKIN, DELIBERATION
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other, or otherwise glorifies or vilifies actors in the national security system.
By maintaining the general criminal prohibition while tying it to a defense
and sentencing mitigation factor, the legal framework would still retain sub-
stantial risk for the person exposing the wrongdoing.  By providing objective
criteria for prosecutors as they evaluate whether to prosecute, for judges and
juries as they decide cases, and for judges as they consider sentencing, the
framework offers a person considering a leak a basis on which to form a
belief, given their knowledge of the contents of the leak, about the likelihood
of successful assertion.
The defense would cover individuals who violate a criminal provision
to expose to public scrutiny substantial violations of law or systemic error,
incompetence, or malfeasance.  The emphasis of the defense would be on the
government behavior disclosed, rather than on the motivation of the person
disclosing.  It requires only that the belief that the disclosure would expose
substantial violations be reasonable, not that the government behavior dis-
closed is ultimately found to have in fact constituted a substantial violation
of law or systemic error, incompetence, or malfeasance (for economy, I will
refer to these as “systemic failure”).  The defense is premised on the pro-
position that the leaker serves a public role, so the defense is public and
systemic, rather than individual-rights based.  As with qualified immunity
for public servants, it is important that the defense be available for reasona-
ble belief that the materials exposed show the pertinent kinds of violations,
not that the actions disclosed are ultimately adjudged illegal.  This belief
element is objective, not subjective.  If the matters revealed in the disclosure
could not reasonably be seen as exposing substantial violations of law or
systemic failure, the defense should not be available.  For example, Samuel
Morison, who leaked satellite photos of the construction of a Soviet aircraft
carrier to Jane’s Defence Weekly, claimed that he acted to persuade the
American public to increase defense spending.115  The claim of subjective
belief is not the critical factor; rather, it is the implausibility of the claim that
releasing the photos exposes substantial illegality or systemic failure on the
part of the United States government in decisions about the level of defense
spending in the early 1980s.  The defense covers only disclosures through a
channel reasonably likely to lead to public dissemination.  There is no reason
to protect leaks to a private party, much less to a foreign government, allied
or enemy, not reasonably designed to lead to public disclosure.  Thus, the
case of Lawrence Franklin,116 who gave information to AIPAC (“the Ameri-
can Israeli Public Affairs Committee “) for the benefit of Israel, would not
be covered under this defense.
115 Philip Weiss, The Quiet Coup: U.S. v. Morrison: A Victory for Secret Government,
HARPER’S,  Sept. 1989, at 54, 58, available at http://harpers.org/archive/1989/09/the-quiet-
coup/.
116 David Johnston, Former Military Analyst Gets Prison Term for Passing Information,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A1.306 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
The defendant must establish that (a) the disclosed actions were reason-
ably seen as illegal or constituted systemic error, incompetence, or malfea-
sance, (b) the disclosure used reasonable means to mitigate harms from the
disclosure, and (c) the disclosure is to a channel reasonably aimed at public
disclosure.
Much of the discussion below will go to the first showing the defendant
must make—that the disclosed actions can reasonably be seen as illegal or
systemic failure.  A word is warranted about mitigation, in particular mitiga-
tion of bulk disclosures.  Some disclosures can in fact cause substantial
harm, even where they disclose wrongdoing.  A leaker can mitigate the harm
by limiting disclosure to information pertaining to the wrongdoing, by limit-
ing and redacting disclosed documents to the minimum necessary, or by lim-
iting the disclosure to a moment when it will no longer cause significant,
articulable harm.  A leaker can also mitigate by disclosing to an organization
that has a capacity or history of managing sensitive documents responsibly.
The latter technique will be the primary mitigation approach in cases of bulk
leaking, like those of Snowden and Manning.  These are likely to become
more significant because, with digital storage, grabbing “everything” is
often faster and harder to detect than grabbing only selected files that evi-
dence wrongdoing.  Because of the difficulty of securing and searching such
bulk caches, this mitigation requirement will tend to favor traditional media
outlets with the resources and experience to do so.  In the second decade of
the twenty-first century, this bias in the defense is hardly uncontroversial.
A major controversy in the Manning case concerned the role of
Wikileaks.  I have elsewhere discussed in depth why Wikileaks and other
members of the networked fourth estate cannot be treated as second-class
citizens under the First Amendment.117  It is important to recognize, how-
ever, that equal status as speakers under the First Amendment does not auto-
matically preclude the public accountability defense from favoring
disclosure to recipients with the organizational and institutional capacity to
minimize the operational damage disclosure could cause.  Certainly, dump-
ing all the materials online in a single unedited site would fulfill the “chan-
nel aimed at disclosing to the public” arm of the defense, but doing so would
offer no meaningful mitigation.  Disclosing to an established major media
site is not more protected as a matter of the First Amendment but may be
more appropriate for availability of the public accountability defense.  If the
leaker limits the documents disclosed, and properly redacts prior to publica-
tion, then the outlet chosen will be less important as to mitigation; but where
the materials are leaked in bulk, that choice matters.  As for Manning’s
choice of Wikileaks, I testified at the court martial that both the public per-
ception of Wikileaks at the time of the leak and Wikileaks’s ex-post alliance
with traditional newspapers to redact and release the materials supported a
finding that Wikileaks was a channel that a reasonable leaker in early 2010
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would see as an outlet able to mitigate the harms.118  One need not agree with
my interpretation of the facts as they stood in early 2010 to recognize that
some actors in the networked fourth estate will have established a reputation,
or a set of well-understood practices that achieve mitigation in ways that are
not inferior to those used by traditional media, or will work in collaboration
with those media to mitigate the harms.  Disclosure through such actors
should be treated as no less evidence of proper mitigation than disclosure
through The New York Times or The Guardian.
Once the defendant shows that the disclosed actions are reasonably
characterized as violations, and that disclosure was reasonably designed to
mitigate the harms, the burden shifts to the government to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the harm is (a) specific, imminent, and substantial,
and (b) outweighs reasonably expected benefits from the disclosure.  The
burden shifting recognizes that the government is more likely to possess the
relevant facts about harm.  The heightened burden reflects recognition that
officials have tended to make broad claims of harm that do not withstand
scrutiny.119  Certain harms should simply be excluded from consideration—
most obviously, where harm is from exposure of the wrongdoing.  For exam-
ple, where the information discloses gross human rights violations, and the
damage of the disclosure is harm to the reputation of the United States, even
to the extent of inflaming violent reaction among victims’ nations, that harm
should be inadmissible to refute the defense.  The Abu Ghraib photos or the
CIA torture program are obvious examples.  Otherwise, the defense would
paradoxically become less available as the behavior disclosed entailed more
shocking and criminal conduct.  Furthermore, where the harm is general, as
opposed to imminent and specifically articulable, it should be accorded little
weight.  For example, in the case of the embassy cables disclosure, a general
harm to frank communications within the State Department’s system, or em-
barrassment in the relations of the United States with nations generally, are
too general and vague to count as imminent, articulable harm.  By contrast,
exposure of names of specific individuals who are put at articulable risk by
the disclosure is such harm.
Because the defense is intended as a systemic pressure valve to counter
destructive internal dynamics, rather than an individual civil liberty of the
leaker, the nature of the disclosed actions plays the dominant role in deter-
mining whether to excuse the individual’s illegal acts.  The more clearly
118 I made the case for this claim in my testimony at the Manning trial, see United States
v. Manning, Court Martial, (Fort Myer, VA, July 10, 2013), available at https://pressfreedom
foundation.org/sites/default/files/07-10-13-AM-session.pdf, https://pressfreedomfoundation.
org/sites/default/files/REVISED-July-10-afternoon.pdf.  The later disclosure of the full cache
of embassy cables, one year later, was an organizational glitch not fundamentally different
from what happened to the United States government itself when the measures it put in place
to prevent a leak failed.
119 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 10, at 324 (discussing Admiral McMullen’s initial claims
about the harm done, followed by Secretary Gates’ more muted formal letter to Congress once
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wrongful the action disclosed is, the more readily the defense should be
available, even where other factors of the defense are weaker.  The Tshwane
Global Principles document,120 developed by NGOs concerned with freedom
of information and national security, offers a valuable list of core areas
where the public interest in disclosure is particularly salient.  Where the in-
formation pertains to these, the reasonableness of the public interest side of
the equation should be presumptively satisfied and could only be out-
weighed by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure caused articulable
imminent danger of the highest order, and even then, if the harm is reasona-
bly mitigated, such as by delayed disclosure or redaction, disclosure should
be excused:
• Substantial violations of human rights and domestic civil rights, and
grave violations of international humanitarian law.
• Significant manipulations of public opinion, misstatements, or im-
proper considerations in decisions to use military force or acquire
weapons of mass destruction.  While the risk of imminent harm from
poorly timed release is clear, so too is the risk of gross error.  It is
precisely in deciding on the use of military force that groupthink and
organizational failure in the national security and military establish-
ments can have their most tragic consequences, and where informing
the public sphere may offer the most critical counterweight to the
internal dynamics of bureaucracies on the path to war.
• Secret laws or rules that govern use of national security or policing
powers in ways that threaten life, limb, and liberty.  This would
cover, for example, OLC memoranda that systematically shape the
legal framework governing executive branch actions with these criti-
cal effects.  Secret law has no place in governing these kinds of
threats away from any mechanism for public debate.  Moreover, law
or rules are generally most removed from operational needs, and of
their nature cover patterns of practice involving civilian control over
national security systems.  Systematically, therefore, their secrecy is
more likely to undermine oversight and public debate than to evade
countermeasures by legitimate national security adversaries.
• Disclosure of the existence of a secret military, intelligence, or polic-
ing unit whose actions systematically involve one of the other cate-
gories of protected disclosure.  While secrecy of some units is
sometimes legitimate and necessary, public oversight is impossible
over an agency whose existence is unknown.
• Surveillance programs and instances of abusive surveillance.  Sur-
veillance is so corrosive to individual freedom and democratic opin-
120 See generally OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDS., THE GLOBAL PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION (TSHWANE PRINCIPLES) (2013), available at http://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/global-principles-national-security-10232013.
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ion formation, association, and expression that its existence and
contours should always be subject to public scrutiny.  The defense
would cover both disclosures of programs, where they are illegal,
unconstitutional, or represent systemic failure, and individual surveil-
lance instances where a reasonable person would think that the sur-
veillance constitutes an abuse (such as the FBI’s wiretapping of
Martin Luther King, Jr.).
• Disclosure narrowly focused on evidence of discrete constitutional or
substantial statutory violations by parts of the national security
establishment.
The presumptive categories are not intended to be exclusive.  Where behav-
ior does not fall within these presumptive categories, a judge hearing the
defense will make a determination of reasonableness of the disclosure.
Given the general baseline commitment of judges to their professional train-
ing and the rule of law, it is unlikely that, in the normal course, judges would
find leaks that did not fall within the statutorily prescribed domains to be
reasonable.  Partly in aid of anchoring that determination, the statute should
include certain kinds of public corrective action whose existence will serve
as conclusive proof that their disclosure was in the public interest, or signifi-
cant efforts to introduce corrective action that will shift the burden of proof
that disclosure was not in the public interest.  These include:
• Judicial finding that the exposed practice violates the Constitution or
the law.  An initial judicial determination later reversed will establish
a presumption that the belief that the information should be disclosed
was reasonable when taken.
• Congressional action. Passage of a law conclusively establishes rea-
sonableness; introduction of bills not passed shifts the burden of
proof to the government to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the information should not have been publicly disclosed.
• Executive branch action. Significant change in the disclosed prac-
tices establishes the reasonableness of the belief.  Significant reports
or executive branch watchdog or review processes that find the dis-
closed practices must be changed will establish a presumption of rea-
sonableness with regard to the initial disclosure.121
• Public opinion. Evidence showing that significant swaths of public
opinions view the disclosed practices as illegal or requiring substan-
tial change will create a presumption of reasonableness.  This might
be established by well-designed media studies, by the presence of
121 This obviously creates a perverse incentive for the executive not to study the disclo-
sures.  The intuition behind this arm of the proof is that (a) the executive branch is sufficiently
complex that different sub-systems within it will not necessarily be able to control each other,
despite the formal unitary organizational structure of the executive, and that (b) executive
branch correction will, in any case, usually occur only where public opinion demands it with
sufficient force such that the marginal impact on the defense in a case against the leaker will
likely be insufficient to control the action.310 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
petitions of sufficient scale, or by clear, professionally conducted
opinion polls.  Here I mean not a hypothetically informed public
opinion, but the highly imperfect system of public opinion as it is
constituted.  While imperfect and subject to manipulation and fash-
ions, its imperfections are different than those that plague the sys-
tems that make up the three branches of government, and the public
accountability defense is specifically intended to undermine efforts
to disable public opinion and the public sphere from exerting control
over the national security system.
Cases involving accountability leak prosecutions will, of necessity, de-
pend overwhelmingly on evidence that concerns classified materials.  Pas-
sage of the defense will require some revision of the Classified Information
Procedures Act.122  In particular, materials publicly disclosed retain their
classification, and a revised procedure should permit courts to accept into
evidence all documents shown to be already in the public domain (such as
where they are published online by a newspaper or other organization), and
all descriptions of documents that disclose no more than was disclosed in
descriptions that are in the public domain.  While the classification power
remains in the hands of the executive, the prejudice to the government’s
interest in maintaining secrecy of already publicly available documents is
minimal, while the prejudice to the defense of inability to rely openly and
publicly on materials central to the defense is substantial.  Moreover, many
aspects of the defense will require the court’s consideration of disclosed
materials that have not been declassified or disclosed.  The systemic failures
we observe in delegated oversight make it is impossible to accept deference
to the government’s judgments in these cases.  Instead, the judge in the case
must be able to assess the evidence both of the reasonableness of the wrong-
doing and of the likelihood of harm.  While in camera proceedings may be
appropriate for some aspects of a case, these should be kept to a minimum.
In particular, proceedings should be kept public unless the judge determines
that no reasonable person could deem the disclosures as falling under the
defense, or the government shows significant, substantial, imminent harm
from holding open proceedings.  Assuring this procedural aspect will be the
primary protection of leakers from “punishment by process,” because it is
only the fear that the government’s actions themselves will be assessed by an
independent judge, in an adversarial process in public court, that would pre-
vent prosecutors from bringing aggressive prosecutions that will cost de-
fendants hundreds of thousands of dollars, years of fear, and ultimately
demeaning plea bargains (even if there was no wrongdoing, as the case of
Thomas Drake amply demonstrates).123  Finally, the defense should clarify
that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence by the government of
imminent, articulable harm, the normal remedy for the government’s insis-
122 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (1980).
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tence on keeping relevant materials classified should result in dismissal of
the charges, rather than a lesser sanction.124
IV. THE DEFENSE AND PAST PRACTICE
As a formal legal matter, the defense is a radical departure from ex-
isting law.  However, the history of national security leaks suggests that the
defense would cohere with actual practices and shared historical understand-
ings of the public role those leaks played.  A review of these cases seen
through the lens of the public accountability defense offers context and con-
fidence that its application in fact would represent a rebalancing relative to
the recent prosecutorial deviation.
• 1942. Morton Seligman leaked decoded Navy messages of the Japa-
nese order of battle to a reporter, whose publication could have ex-
posed the fact that the United States had cracked the Japanese naval
codes.125  There was no disclosure of government wrongdoing, and
the disclosure could have disabled a critical war-making capability—
reading foreign enemy codes in a hot war.  The defense would not be
available.  Seligman was not prosecuted.  He was, however, left
ashore and denied promotion.126
• 1970. Christopher Pyle disclosed in writing and congressional testi-
mony the existence of a U.S. Army domestic intelligence program
aimed at antiwar and civil rights activists.127  The fact of domestic
surveillance falls under the violations of civil rights, surveillance,
and illegality.  The revelations led to investigation by the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee under Chairman Sam Ervin, who also hired Pyle
to work on the subject for the Committee.128  On the major attributes
of illegality, abuse of civil liberties, and objective external indicia of
public interest, Pyle’s is an easy case.  He was not prosecuted.
124 See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(2) (1980) (providing that where evidence is subject to non-
disclosure, the court will dismiss the indictment, or, if dismissal does not serve justice, dismiss
specified counts, find against the United States on issues to which the classified information
pertains, or strike or preclude testimony covered by the non-disclosure determination).  In the
text, I propose that dismissal, rather than the provided lesser sanctions, should be the strong
presumptive norm in cases of whistleblower prosecution, and that Congress should make that
categorical determination when it fashions the public accountability defense.
125 See generally Brennan, supra note 63.
126 Id.
127 See Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics,
WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1970, at 4; Christopher Pyle, Conus Revisted, The Army Covers Up,
WASH. MONTHLY, July 1970, at 49.
128 See Christopher Pyle, Whistleblower Who Sparked Church Hearings of 1970s, on Mili-
tary Spying of Olympia Peace Activists,  DEMOCRACY N OW! (July 29, 2009), http://www.
democracynow.org/2009/7/29/pyle.312 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
• 1970. Perry Fellwock was the first major NSA leaker.129  In an inter-
view to Ramparts magazine he disclosed that the NSA existed and
conducted extensive signals intelligence on the Soviet Union, that the
agency had information sharing arrangements with other nations, and
that it systematically recorded and searched phone calls into or out of
the United States.130  Fellwock was a less obvious candidate for the
defense.  Most of the revelations did not disclose clear wrongdoing,
but the core disclosures did include two among the heightened public
interest concerns: disclosure of the existence of a major military or
intelligence body requiring oversight (the NSA) and disclosure of
surveillance affecting broad swaths of the population.  The former is
an important category because one cannot perform oversight over a
body one does not know exists, although the disclosures described no
particular abuses; the latter because the question of how much elec-
tronic surveillance to employ is a matter of critical significance in
any democracy.  Disclosure was relatively narrowly circumscribed.
What was disclosed was primarily the existence of a longstanding
program, rather than particular operational details creating a present
risk of harm, suggesting that the harm would be of the type that can
be absorbed for sufficiently significant disclosures.  Objective indicia
that the disclosures covered matters reasonably considered meriting
public scrutiny include that Fellwock’s disclosures were part of the
materials that the Ervin and Church Committees considered, and
with regard to communications from the United States abroad, one
can see the passage of FISA as in part responsive to these disclo-
sures.131  The defense, while less clear than in the case of Pyle, would
apply; Fellwock was never prosecuted.
• 1971. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo present the paradigm case
of defensible whistleblowing.  Disclosing edited versions of the Pen-
tagon Papers, Ellsberg offered materials that went to the heart of a
core public interest—decisions about war-making—and was tailored
to avoid specific articulable harm while fostering public accountabil-
ity.132  Disclosure to The New York Times was clearly calculated to
reach the public.133  As far as objective indicia are concerned, here
the case would fall in the category of broad media coverage and
129 Natasha Lennard, The Original NSA Whistleblower: Snowden is a Patriot, SALON (Nov
12, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/12/the_original_nsa_whistleblower_
snowden_is_a_patriot/.
130 See generally David Horowitz, U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir, 11 RAMPARTS
35 (1972).
131 See generally PATRICK R ADDEN K EEFE, CHATTER: UNCOVERING THE E CHELON S UR-
VEILLANCE NETWORK AND THE SECRET W ORLD OF GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING (2005).
132 See Daniel Ellsberg, Secrecy and National Security Whistleblowing, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-ellsberg/secrecy-and-national-secu_b_
2469058.html.
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proof of impact on public debate (which in the fullness of historical
time is unchallengeable, but may have provided significant barriers
of proof were it to be proven as an element in the defense).  Ellsberg
was prosecuted, but the case was ultimately dismissed for
prosecutorial misconduct.134  In the broader historical narrative of the
American collective memory, Ellsberg remains the paradigm case of
a leaker whose acts should not have been prosecuted, and whose
prosecutors and investigators are remembered as the primary offend-
ers.  Russo helped Ellsberg, was indicted with him, and his indict-
ment was dismissed in the same process.135
• 1984. Samuel Morison disclosed satellite images of a Soviet aircraft
carrier to Jane’s.136  This was an easy case for denying the defense:
the disclosure did not fall into the major concerns of public interest,
nor was it followed by any significant public acts of reform.  Mori-
son was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison.137  He was
later pardoned by President Clinton, largely on Senator Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan’s concern that the Espionage Act had been applied
erratically and inconsistently, with Morison’s conviction being the
sole conviction in its first eight decades.138  Morison’s two-year sen-
tence suggests a proper departure point for sentences where disclo-
sure does not meet the requirements of the defense, and the ultimate
pardon suggests that even where the defense does not apply directly,
the broad systemic considerations of assuring accountability through
a well-informed investigative press may override considerations of
national security and counsel against criminal prosecution in the ab-
sence of clear, articulable harm.
• 2002. Jesselyn Radack, a former DOJ attorney, disclosed informa-
tion to the press that suggested that the prosecution of John Walker
Lindh (the “American Taliban”) was tainted by violations of Lindh’s
right to counsel, and that the prosecution removed documents—
emails from her to interrogators—that would have established those
violations at Lindh’s trial.139  The documents were not classified,
though the DOJ claimed they were covered by attorney-client privi-
134 See Generally Martin Arnold, Pentagon Papers Charges are Dismissed; Judge Byrne
Frees Ellsberg and Russo, Assails ‘Improper Government Conduct’,  N.Y TIMES, May 12,
1973, at A1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0511.html#
article.
135 Id.
136 Stephen Engelberg, Spy Photos’ Sale Leads to Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, October 3, 1984, at
A8.
137 Michael Wright & Caroline Rand Herron, The Nation; Two Years for Morrison, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1985, at E4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/08/weekinreview/
the-nation-two-years-for-morison.html.
138 Letter from Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Senator, to William Clinton, U.S. President,
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/04/moynihan.html.
139 Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER (March 10, 2003), http://www.newyorker.
com/archive/2003/03/10/030310fa_fact2?currentPage=1.314 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
lege.140  The context—the first prosecution surrounding the Afghani-
stan war, and violations of individual constitutional rights in a
tribunal held in camera for national security purposes—locates it
closer to the concerns of this article.  Radack was subjected to crimi-
nal investigations, pressure on employers that caused her to lose jobs,
and efforts to have her disbarred.141  The public accountability de-
fense would have applied to her actions had she been charged, since
the violations were of civil rights, and the harm was merely that the
violations would have been exposed to a proper court.  Its practical
irrelevance to the sustained pressure on Radack, which did not take
the form of a prosecution, underscores the fact that the government
has substantial powers to intimidate bearers of inconvenient truths,
even in the presence of a criminal defense.142  Addressing these kinds
of concerns would require not only expansion of the Federal
Whistleblower Protection Act to national security, but also more
toothsome remedies, perhaps through a federal tort, for abusive retal-
iation by any means.
• 2003. Lawrence Franklin conveyed classified documents about U.S.
policy toward Iran to employees of AIPAC.  Franklin is an easy case
where the defense would not be available because his disclosures
were not to a channel reasonably likely to inform the public.  His
initial thirteen-year sentence was later reduced to ten months of
house arrest.143
• 2004. Thomas Tamm and Russ Tice, separately, were sources of the
New York Times disclosures of the PSP.144  These provide easy cases
for eligibility of the defense.  They narrowly disclosed, to a channel
clearly calculated to inform the public, the existence of a program
later found to be illegal and in violation of basic constitutional rights
prohibitions on warrantless searches.  Neither was prosecuted.145
• 2004. William Binney, Kirk Wiebe, Ed Loomis, and Diane Roark
were three NSA employees and a congressional staffer (Roark) to the
140 Radack v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 402 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103 (D.D.C. 2005).
141 See Frank Lindh, America’s ‘Detainee 001’ – the Persecution of John Walker Lindh,
THE G UARDIAN, (July 9, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/10/john-walker-
lindh-american-taliban-father.
142 Jesselyn Radack, A Whistle-Blower’s Inside View of the Homeland Security Nominee,
L.A. TIMES (Feb 4, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/04/opinion/oe-radack4. See
generally JESSELYN RADACK, TRAITOR: THE WHISTLEBLOWER AND THE “AMERICAN T ALIBAN”
(2012).
143 Nathan Guttman, Once Labeled an AIPAC Spy, Larry Franklin Tells His Story, JEWISH
DAILY FORWARD (July 1, 2009), http://forward.com/articles/108778/once-labeled-an-aipac-
spy-larry-franklin-tells-his/.
144 Brian Ross, NSA Whistleblower Alleges Illegal Spying, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1491889;  Govt. Looks for Leaker on
Warrantless Wiretaps,  NEWSWEEK (Aug. 12, 2007), http://www.newsweek.com/govt-looks-
leaker-warrantless-wiretaps-99001?tid=relatedcl.
145 Josh Gerstein, Wiretapping Leak Probe Dropped, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2011, 8:00 PM),
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then-Chair of the House Intelligence Committee.  All four were in-
volved in classic, internal whistleblowing (except in contacting a
congressional staffer, albeit one privileged to be part of the oversight
process): raising objections that the communications surveillance
system the NSA bought, Trailblazer, was substantially more expen-
sive and less respectful of civil rights than an in-house system devel-
oped by Binney, ThinThread.146  Both NSA and DOD Inspectors
General ultimately agreed that Trailblazer was an expensive failure.
The four disclosed nothing to the press, and pursued a concern later
validated, but were subject to aggressive and disruptive investigation,
their homes were raided, and they were named as unindicted co-con-
spirators in the Drake indictment.147  Their cases offer an important
example of abusive investigation and punishment by process.
• 2004/2005. Thomas Drake was an NSA employee in several leader-
ship positions, who had supported Binney et al. in the concerns they
voiced and was a major source for the DOD Inspector General’s re-
port on Trailblazer.148  Frustrated with the lack of effect of the inter-
nal paths that he, Binney, Wiebe, and Loomis had taken, Drake
discussed fraud and waste at the NSA with a Baltimore Sun reporter,
without disclosing any classified information.149  Drake was indicted
under the Espionage Act, charged with ten counts (each carrying a
ten-year sentence),150 and he ultimately pled guilty to retention of
national security information, though the prosecution could show no
disclosures of classified materials.151  Like Radack’s mistreatment,
the Drake prosecution, which dragged on for several years and
placed him under threat of substantial penalties, is a crisp example of
abuse of prosecution as punishment for whistleblowing.  The breadth
and vagueness of the Espionage Act or the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act make it possible to bring a prosecution carrying grave
consequences against someone who brought matters of public con-
cern to the public without disclosing any classified information.  This
kind of in terrorem process requires a remedy, perhaps by limiting
the qualified immunity prosecutors and investigators normally enjoy,
146 Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER (May 23, 2011), http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2011/05/23/110523fa_fact_mayer?currentPage=all.
147 NSA Whistleblower Kirk Wiebe Details Gov’t Retaliation After Helping Expose “Gross
Mismanagement,” DEMOCRACY N OW! (Dec 19, 2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/
12/19/nsa_whistleblower_kirk_wiebe_details_govt.
148 See Mayer, supra note 146.
149 Siobhan Gorman, System Error, BALT. SUN (Jan 29, 2006), http://articles.baltimoresun.
com/2006-01-29/news/0601280286_1_intelligence-experts-11-intelligence-trailblazer; see also
Mayer, supra note 146.
150 Scott Shane, Former N.S.A. Official Charged in Leaks Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/us/16indict.html?_r=0.
151 See Reuters, Ex-Official for N.S.A. Accepts Deal in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 11,
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but is unlikely to be resolved adequately within the confines of the
criminal defense discussed here.
• 2006. Mark Klein, a retired AT&T employee, disclosed to The New
York Times152 that AT&T had voluntarily complied with NSA re-
quests to monitor Internet communications that pass through AT&T’s
facilities in a major switching facility in San Francisco.153  Klein’s
disclosures played a central role, alongside Tamm and Tice, in expos-
ing the PSP.154  Klein did not have security clearance and the docu-
ments he disclosed were unclassified technical documents whose
national security meaning became apparent only in the context of
their use in connection with the installation of a secret room within
the AT&T facility.
• 2006. Jeffery Sterling leaked details of a successful CIA operation to
feed defective information to Iran’s nuclear weapons program; it
presented no obvious insight into any plausible violation of law or
systemic failure.155  While useful to the media, the failure to disclose
actions that a reasonable person would consider a violation of law or
systemic failure would make the public accountability defense
unavailable.156
• 2009. Shamai Leibowitz presents a complex case.  Leibowitz was an
FBI translator.  He leaked transcripts of intercepted calls to a regu-
larly publishing blogger.  Details are scarce because the materials
were never published.157  Leibowitz claimed that his disclosures were
intended to expose FBI illegal acts,158 “very similar to what Edward
Snowden has reported about the NSA.”159  The blogger told New
York Times reporter Scott Shane that Leibowitz leaked Israeli em-
bassy intercepts, and was trying to expose Israel’s aggressive efforts
to shape American public opinion and policy, in particular toward a
152 See generally Markoff & Shane, supra note 9.
153 See generally Affidavit of Mark Klein, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 06-CV-0676), available at https://www.eff.org/document/klein-
declaration.
154 See The NSA Whistleblower,  ABC NEWS (March 7, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/
Nightline/video?id=2930944.
155 Greg Miller, Former CIA Officer Jeffrey A. Sterling Charged in Leak Probe, WASH.
POST (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR
2011010604001.html.
156 Public debate surrounding the events had to do with the fact that investigators issued a
subpoena to James Risen, the New York Times reporter to whom Sterling leaked, and thereby
threatened reporters, not only the leaker.
157 Scott Shane, Leak Offers Look at Efforts by U.S. to Spy on Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2011, at A1.
158 See Shamai Leibowitz, Blowback From the White House’s Vindictive War on
Whistleblowers, THE GUARDIAN (July 5, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/com-
mentisfree/2013/jul/05/blowback-white-house-whistleblowers.
159 Shamai Leibowitz, Edward Snowden and the Crackdown That Backfired, LEIBOWITZ
BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://www.shamaileibowitz.com/2013/06/edward-snowden-man-of-
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strike on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.160  Leibowitz denied this out-
right,161 but was constrained by his plea agreement from providing
further details.162  Contemplating the risk of long imprisonment,
Leibowitz pled guilty to a lesser offense and was sentenced to twenty
months imprisonment.163
Remarkably, the judge apparently had “no idea” what docu-
ments Leibowitz had leaked, and why they had compromised secur-
ity.164  If the documents in fact were, as the recipient claimed, about
aggressive and misguided moves by the government of Israel, then
an American court cannot recognize these as providing a defense to
violation of American secrecy laws.  If, however, the documents dis-
closed, as Leibowitz claims, illegal and unconstitutional phone taps
by the FBI, then his case would fall squarely within the public ac-
countability defense.165
This case underscores the important effect the defense could
have on moderating the prosecution’s considerations as to whether to
bring a case in the first place.  If the public accountability defense
had been available, prosecutors would have had to contend with the
possibility that, if they prosecuted the case and it involved documents
that disclosed illegality, the defendant could assert the defense and a
federal judge who was not part of the FISC would consider the legal-
ity of the agency’s action.166  Systematically, the more clearly illegal
or wrongful the official behavior disclosed, the higher the risk to the
national security establishment from such an independent judicial re-
view, and the less likely a prosecution.  That systematic effect is a
160 See Shane, supra note 157; see also Richard Silverstein, Why I Published US Intelli-
gence Secrets About Israel’s Anti-Iran Campaign, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 14, 2011, 11:25 AM), http:/
/www.truth-out.org/news/item/3499:why-i-published-us-intelligence-secrets-about-israels-an-
tiiran-campaign.
161 See Leibowitz, supra note 159.
162 Maria Gold, Former FBI Employee Sentenced for Leaking Classified Papers, WASH.
POST (May 25, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/24/
AR2010052403795.html (“As part of the arrangement, he agreed to file no requests for docu-
ments concerning the investigation and to ‘never disclose,’ except to those who are authorized
by the government, any classified or sensitive information he learned while working for the
FBI.”).
163 Stephen Aftergood, Jail Sentence Imposed in Leak Case, SECRECY N EWS (May 25,
2010), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2010/05/jail_leak/.
164 Shane, supra note 157 (“‘All I know is that it’s a serious case,’ Judge Alexander Wil-
liams Jr., of United States District Court in Maryland, said at the sentencing in May 2010. ‘I
don’t know what was divulged other than some documents, and how it compromised things, I
have no idea.’”).
165 The fact that disclosure was to a blogger, rather than a traditional journalist, is not
dispositive.  The blog appears to be regularly published, and a reasonable channel for public
communication, even if it failed to publish in this instance.  Moreover, the fact that the docu-
ments were never published argues against a finding that disclosing the documents to that blog
was tantamount to dumping the documents online unedited and unredacted.
166 This would require a more general review of the use of classified evidence in criminal
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desirable effect of the defense, given the enormous costs to leakers
associated with being indicted, even for leakers who would ulti-
mately win on the defense.
• 2009. Stephen Kim was a State Department employee who leaked
the existence of a conversation suggesting that North Korea was
about to test a nuclear bomb.167  While the subject is of critical public
interest, there was no suggestion of illegality or systemic failure in
the U.S. government’s decision to keep the information secret.
Moreover, disclosure was not aimed to, nor was it likely to lead to, a
significant change in American law or policy in a way that corrects
internal systemic errors.  The harm was mostly retrospective, and in
this regard likely minimal, which would militate against prosecution,
but the public accountability defense on its own terms would be ei-
ther entirely unavailable or very weak.  In January of 2014, Kim pled
guilty and agreed to serve a thirteen-month prison term.168
The primary public debate in the case surrounded the fact that
prosecutors characterized James Rosen, the Fox News reporter to
whom Kim had leaked, as having behaved “much like an intelligence
officer would run an [sic] clandestine intelligence source,”169 and
asserted under oath that “there is probable cause to believe that the
Reporter has committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 793 (part of the
Espionage Act), at the very least, either as an aider, abettor, or co-
conspirator of Mr. Kim.”170  While my discussion throughout this pa-
per has focused on the leakers themselves, who have been the subject
of prosecutions to date, the systemic justifications of the defense re-
quire that it be available to the public outlets of the leaked materials
as well—the reporters, news outlets, and, because their relative polit-
ical weakness makes them more politically-palatable targets, outlets
in the networked fourth estate in particular.  In other words, the de-
fense must be available on its own systemic terms, by statute, over
and above any First Amendment claims the public speakers who dis-
seminate the information may have.171
• 2007/2012. John Kiriakou presents a compound case.  The leak for
which he was prosecuted was an unintentional disclosure of the iden-
167 Charlie Savage, Ex-Contractor at State Dept. Pleads Guilty in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2014, at A10.
168 Josh Gerstein, Stephen Kim Pleads Guilty in Fox News Leak Case, POLITICO (Feb. 7,
2014, 2:25 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/stephen-kim-james-risen-state-depart-
ment-fox-news-103265.html.
169 See  Application for Search Warrant ¶ 39, In re Search of E-mail Account [RE-
DACTED]@gmail.com on Computer Servers Operated by Google, Inc., No. 10-MJ-00291-
AK (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/local/affidavit-
for-search-warrant/162/.
170 Id. at ¶ 40.
171 For a discussion of the limited protection the First Amendment offers journalists
against criminal prosecution, the role of constitutional culture, rather than constitutional law,
and the risks this poses for the networked fourth estate, see Benkler, supra note 10, at 363–65.2014] A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 319
tity of a CIA agent,172 the kind of information least likely to fit the
defense because it places an individual at risk while exposing no vio-
lations of law or systemic failure.  Kiriakou was sentenced to thirty
months imprisonment for this disclosure.173  However, there is some
possibility that Kiriakou was singled out for prosecution because he
had earlier leaked details about the CIA’s infamous torture program,
disclosures for which he was not prosecuted.174  It should be clear
that disclosure of torture, a program that so clearly violates funda-
mental human rights, goes to the very heart of a public accountability
defense.  Should a leaker offer details that substantiate the presence,
scope, or responsibility for such systematic violation of as basic a
human right as the prohibition on torture, the leaker should enjoy full
immunity under almost any circumstances.  Perhaps, in an extreme
case where disclosure directly endangered, in the immediate future,
actual, identifiable lives, culpability could attach.  But disclosure of
systematic torture is perhaps the clearest example of a leak that will
almost certainly be protected.  The Kirakou case therefore suggests
that where the government is pursuing an action on an unrelated dis-
closure, itself illegal, the court must take into consideration the total-
ity of the disclosures; and where the actual charge, even if true, is
found to be pretextual or peripheral to the core disclosure, the defen-
dant should be eligible for the defense.
• 2010. Chelsea (Bradley) Manning was responsible for leaking sev-
eral hundred thousand reports (so called “war logs”) from units in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and 250,000 State Department embassy cables
to Wikileaks.175  Several potential violations of human rights or laws
of war were disclosed by some of the war logs, alone or in combina-
tion.  A helicopter gun camera video showed a gunship attacking a
civilian van offering aid to individuals injured by an earlier attack
from the same gunship.176  This second strike injured two children
who were in the van and apparently killed a Reuters reporter who
172 Scott Shane, Ex-Officer Is First From C.I.A. to Face Prison for a Leak, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/us/former-cia-officer-is-the-first-to-face-
prison-for-a-classified-leak.html?pagewanted=all.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., John Kiriakou, I Got 30 Months in Prison. Why Does Leon Panetta Get a
Pass?,  L.A. TIMES (March 9, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/09/opinion/la-oe-
kiriakou-panetta-whistleblower-20140309; Associated Press, CIA ‘Whistleblower’ John
Kiriakou Jailed for Two Years for Identity Leak, THE GUARDIAN (Oct 23, 2012), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/23/cia-whistleblower-john-kiriakou-leak.
175 See Scott Shane & Andrew Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1.
176 See Collateral Murder, COLLATERAL MURDER (April 5, 2010), http://www.collateral
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had been injured in the initial volley.177  Later parts of the video
showed the same gunship crew in a separate engagement, again
shooting a second missile as civilians are visibly climbing the rubble
to aid injured survivors of a first missile they had shot.178  The war
logs showed that civilian casualties in Iraq were substantially higher
than those publicly reported by the Pentagon,179 and disclosed the
existence of Task Force 373, a targeted assassination squad;180 the
logs also showed that U.S. forces knew of torture by the Iraqi secur-
ity services and did not systematically protest or prevent these from
continuing, even where the U.S. forces had the power to do so.181
The embassy cables, by contrast, disclosed potential violations by the
governments of other countries,182 but not by the State Department or
the U.S. government itself.  As an initial matter, then, some of the
materials Private Manning released would make her eligible for the
defense.  The scope and breadth of the disclosure, coupled with the
fact that the majority of the documents did not disclose gross viola-
tions, suggest that, at least in its full version, the defense would be
inappropriate.  Had Manning selected only those materials that evi-
denced core wrongs and released those, the defense would have ap-
plied.  Because the materials—although broad—included matters of
special public concern, and because they were clearly intended to be
made public, the Manning case presents a particularly crisp instance
where the defense would better operate as a sentencing mitigation
factor rather than a complete defense.  Considering the sentences in
the cases of Morison, Leibowitz, Kiriakou, and Kim (much less
Franklin), Manning’s thirty-five-year sentence was overwhelmingly
excessive by comparison to any prior leak to the media.183
177 See Leaked U.S. Video Shows Deaths of Reuters’ Iraqi Staffers, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2010,
8:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/06/us-iraq-usa-journalists-idUSTRE6344
FW20100406.
178 See Benkler, supra note 10, at 51.
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GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2010, 4:32 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/true-ci-
vilian-body-count-iraq.
180 C. J. Chivers et al., The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010,
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These missions, which have been stepped up under the Obama administration, claim notable
successes, but have sometimes gone wrong, killing civilians and stoking Afghan
resentment.”).
181 David Leigh & Maggie O’Kane, Iraq War Logs: US Turned Over Captives to Iraqi
Torture Squads, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2010, 3:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2010/oct/24/iraq-war-logs-us-iraqi-torture?guni=Article:in%20body%20link.
182 See U.S. Embassy Cables Interactive Database, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2010, 1:10
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How would Edward Snowden fare under the public accountability de-
fense?  Most of Snowden’s disclosures fall squarely within the defense, but
some exposed details that likely impeded legitimate programs.
The disclosures included four distinct classes.  First, programs known
in public as “Bullrun” aimed at weakening cybersecurity for everyone, by
undermining basic security standards-setting processes to simplify acquisi-
tion and analysis of bulk data.184  Second, documents disclosed the existence
and some details of several bulk collection programs under a range of legal
authorities: Executive Order 12333 acquisition of data considered purely for-
eign,185 FISA 702 collection of all data other than data completely within the
United States or of individuals known to be U.S. persons,186 and PATRIOT
Act 215 collection of business records, in particular telephony metadata,
wholly within the United States.187  Third, disclosures offered substantial in-
sight into the secret oversight process, in particular, the FISC process.188
Fourth, documents disclosed intelligence practices that involve targeting spe-
cific computers, publicly known as Tailored Access Operations (“TAO”).189
Disclosure of the telephony metadata collection program is the most
defensible of the Snowden disclosures.  As Judge Leon in Klayman,190 the
majority of the PCLOB,191 and at least one member of the President’s Re-
view Group192 stated, the telephony bulk collection program likely violates
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the Fourth Amendment.  Moreover, a substantial number of members of
Congress have joined efforts to amend the PATRIOT Act to prohibit this
practice.193  External objective evidence that the exposed conduct was
wrongful is readily established, and the magnitude and ubiquity of the re-
sponse strongly support availability of the defense in this case.194
Section 702 data collection differs primarily in that it refers to collec-
tion of communications predominately external to the United States and
therefore not covered by the Fourth Amendment.195  Nonetheless, these col-
lection efforts sweep in significant numbers of protected communications, as
well as millions of communications of innocent non-U.S. citizens, who are
protected by human rights, if not American civil rights.196  There should
therefore be a presumption of reasonableness for their disclosure.  Unlike the
telephony metadata program, the PRG report suggests that 702 data did play
a role in preventing terrorism, and exposure may lead to reduction of the
program’s capabilities.197  While this harm exists, it appears to be longer-
term reduction in efficacy, rather than articulable, immediate operational
harm that would clearly outweigh the benefits, given the significance of the
disclosure.  Even if the 702 collection is legal, it is the kind of decision,
affecting Americans and innocent civilians in other nations, that merits pub-
lic debate and a democratic decision.  The 12333 programs are fully foreign
but fall under the broader sense of systemic failure. Most famously the
“Muscular” program involved hacking foreign-located data centers of
Google and Yahoo! and obtaining communications, including communica-
tions of U.S. users.198  The harm of disclosure, as with 702 programs, will
likely require changed procedures to assure protection of rights, which is not
a cognizable harm, and longer-term adaptation of techniques to recover lost
effectiveness.  While certainly relevant, such harms are too remote and grad-
ual to outweigh the benefit of exposing a program with such far-reaching
implications for rights at home and abroad.
Exposure of court orders and the limitations of the oversight system
plainly fall at the core of proper disclosure.  The documents exposed the
limitations of the delegated oversight system introduced in the post-Water-
gate era.  Myriad legislative reforms and executive branch proposals confirm
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that the leaked documents exposed significant flaws in judicial review of
NSA surveillance, flaws that the American public through its representatives
seeks to correct.  These facts create a presumption of reasonableness of
disclosure.
The Bullrun disclosures are the least widely understood, and represent
the category of violations of systemic failure, not illegality.  The NSA under-
mined standards-setting and product-design processes, intervening in market
and non-profit activities to achieve an outcome of profound public conse-
quence.199  Effectively, the NSA made a decision that its intelligence func-
tion was so important that it was worth making the Internet less safe for
everyone, from everyone, in order to make it less impregnable to NSA spy-
ing.200  Like a decision to ground all air traffic to avoid terrorism, that deci-
sion cannot be made without public debate.  It goes to the heart of how a
society defines security.  The most explicit acceptance of this critique has
been the PRG report.  The report recommended that no part of the U.S. gov-
ernment should undermine encryption standards or subvert generally availa-
ble commercial software,201 and more fundamentally, recommended a
reorganization of the NSA that would separate parts of the agency responsi-
ble for communications security, which would form a separate unit in the
Pentagon, from signals intelligence, and both would be separate from the
United States Cyber Command.202  These organizational changes appear
crafted to avoid repetition of the kind of myopia represented by Bullrun, in
which signals intelligence dominated communications security, cyber-
security, and both market and social innovation processes.  The fact that the
independent review group found the program to be one that required sub-
stantial change is the kind of evidence that can show that disclosure was
reasonable when made.
Unless one completely abandons espionage as a tool, however, TAO
represents the kind of operation that most closely resembles individualized
search; has the least negative impact on democracy, individual dignity, or
autonomy on a societal level; and is expensive enough to increase our confi-
dence that it will be aimed at legitimate targets.  Disclosure of TAO is there-
fore least likely to expose abuse or violations of law or systemic failure,
while also being most likely to cause operational harms.  The question it
poses for us is whether the harm caused by these disclosures to these pro-
grams is large enough to deny Snowden the defense, given the significance
of the other disclosures.
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To summarize, disclosure of the telephony metadata program and the
limitations of the FISC is clearly protected.  Disclosures of Bullrun, 702
collection, and Muscular also should enjoy the defense.  Disclosure of TAO
alone, however, would likely not have properly come under the defense.
Given the breadth and depth of public concern over the former aspects of the
program and the extensive, multi-branch condemnation of so many aspects
of the disclosed programs and oversight system, Snowden presents a case
where the overall significance of the disclosures is not only reasonable, but
also overcomes claims of harm, once the harms claimed are properly re-
duced to losses in articulable operational terms, rather than general necessity
to recalibrate surveillance measures.  The defense would be rendered mean-
ingless, however, if prosecutors were free to cherry pick the least defensible
disclosures, charge offenses based on them alone, and limit introduction of
the entirety of the disclosure.  To prevent prosecutors from manipulating
cases to nullify the defense, courts must permit defendants to introduce other
public disclosures that arose from a common set of operative facts that led to
the disclosure of the charged documents as relevant to the defense.  Courts
would then have to assess the relative weight of the disclosures that would
be covered by the defense and those that would not.  The critical point is that
courts cannot exclude such disclosures from the record as irrelevant simply
because they were not included in the charged documents.  This is particu-
larly important in bulk disclosure cases of the type made more feasible by
digitized information, where the use of a reliable intermediary for mitigation
is critical, and where admixture of information disclosing violations of law
or systemic failure with information that does not include such disclosures
will be the rule, rather than the exception.  In Snowden’s case, the prepon-
derance of the disclosures were within the defense, and the defense should
not be susceptible to prosecutorial circumvention by charging only the sub-
set of documents that would not be eligible for the defense by themselves.
V. CONCLUSION
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in criminal prosecutions
to deter national security leakers and whistleblowers.  The technical ease of
leaking large dumps of data offers an explanation for the form that two of
the major leak cases took, but the driver of increased leaks appears to be
individual conscience resisting perceived abuse of power under the post-9/11
state of emergency.  As was true of the burst of national security
whistleblowers in the 1970s, the response of the national security establish-
ment to the state of emergency has led to conflicts between system behavior
and the individual conscience of insiders.  This tension destabilized the sta-
tus quo that prevailed since the mid-1970s, where leaks were generally not
prosecuted, or, in an extremely rare prosecution, punished at levels well be-
low legal maxima.  The new disruption has led to a significant heightening2014] A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 325
of risk of criminal prosecution, with its attendant risks of suppressing genu-
inely valuable exposure and public accountability.
The national security establishment is not an abstract system of values.
It is a set of organizations and institutions subject to the standard limitations
that typify all organizations and collective sense-making processes.  While
the special risks associated with breaching the secrecy of national security
agencies are well recognized, it is important to understand that precisely the
critical role that these bureaucracies play also makes oversight, accountabil-
ity, and error correction indispensable.  The post-Watergate delegated over-
sight model proved adequate for a long period, but buckled under the post-9/
11 state of emergency mindset.  Whether it is in the macro decision to
launch the Iraq War on false premises, the narrower but morally abhorrent
decision to adopt torture, or the excesses of pervasive surveillance, the na-
tional security establishment has made systematic and significant operational
and normative errors, and has successfully coopted or subverted its institu-
tionalized oversight system to avoid accountability and error correction.  The
study of the national security establishment as a system should also under-
mine our confidence in current efforts to reform the bulk surveillance prob-
lem that has been the subject of our case analysis here.  Heavy reliance on
minimization rules and a somewhat improved FISC process ignores the sys-
tematic imbalance between the executive elements of the national security
establishment and the FISC, the technical complexity of the bulk surveil-
lance that makes judicial oversight vastly more difficult than in the normal
case of warrants and subpoenas, and the pressure and systemic error dynam-
ics that would, of necessity, pervade minimization procedures and their judi-
cial oversight.
In the face of repeated system failure, individual conscience and the
refusal of individuals to play along—coupled with public pressure that
comes from disclosure—require that we recreate the space for safe unautho-
rized disclosures of matters of grave public concern.  A first step will be
introduction of a public accountability defense in criminal law to protect
sources who inform the public of significant violations of human and civil
rights, major matters of war and peace, and other instances of substantial
error, incompetence, and malfeasance.  A review of the major cases arising
from disclosures of national security secrets in the past fifty years suggests
that adopting such a defense would be a less radical step than appears on its
face.
A public accountability criminal defense would be a first step only.  As
Jesselyn Radack’s case illustrates, the Executive can use administrative sanc-
tions to deter whistleblowers without recourse to criminal prosecution, and
as Drake’s case illustrates, it can use aggressive prosecution to impose pun-
ishment by process even if the defense ultimately prevails.  To combat these,
it will be important to complement the criminal defense with a private cause
of action for abusive process, shaped along similar contours to those out-
lined here for the criminal defense.  Moreover, given the critical role that326 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 8
whistleblowers play, the private cause of action should be coupled with a
modification of the qualified immunity of prosecutors and investigators.  In
particular, as objective facts unfold that tend to support the availability of the
defense, such as judicial or legislative corrective action, these should be in-
corporated into a determination of whether continuation of an investigation
or prosecution reasonably open continues to be so, or has become abusive.
Disclosure is no panacea.  The politics of national security tend to lead
majorities to be overly lenient even when disclosures show national security
illegality or failure.203  Accountability in the sense of people responsible for
the illegality or systemic failure being prosecuted or losing their jobs, as
appropriate, a reliable level of public discourse that would actually lead the
public to pay attention to systemic failure, and a political system that trans-
lates such public opinion into action are all critical for our open, democratic
society to utilize its greatest power to continuously learn about our failures
and improve on them.  But information about illegality and systemic failure
is a critical element in the longer-term struggle to resist the inevitable risks
associated with having a large, complex, and powerful national security sys-
tem.  A powerful legislative push against the increasingly aggressive prose-
cutions of the past decade, such a public accountability defense would
restore something close to the pre-9/11 equilibrium in practice and, impor-
tantly, would do so by institutionalizing a basic skepticism about the extent
to which the national security establishment can be trusted to avoid the hum-
drum failures that all large, complex organizations suffer.  Recognizing our
limitations is the beginning, even if only the beginning, of addressing them.
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